

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

CIVIL INTELLIGENCE SECTION

SPECIAL REPORT

SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

PART XIX

DRAFTING THE AXIS ALLIANCE

(10 Mar - 6 Jun 1939)

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

CIVIL INTELLIGENCE SECTION

THE SAIONJI - HARADA MEMOIRS

PART NINETEEN: DRAFTING THE AXIS ALLIANCE

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Saionji - Harada Memoirs

Chapter 317
(10 March 1939)

Oshima and Shiratori Balk

Translated by Miss Chito Isonaga

I met ARITA on the 2nd and spoke to him of my conversation with the English Ambassador and he also agreed with me in connection with my caution regarding the English Ambassador. ARITA stated: "The atmosphere within the country is very delicate even for us who hold responsible positions and are endeavoring somehow to effect a break in Japan's foreign policy. Therefore, no matter how over-zealous a foreign ambassador might be to get various matters accomplished, he will not succeed. The most vital thing is to sit still and wait awhile. The more headlong he rushes into a thing, the more the result will be unfavorable. So, as you say, even if he (English Ambassador) indiscriminately attempts to meet various influential Japanese in order to get something accomplished, it will not turn out to his advantage."

On the 3rd I saw the Premier and he said: "Well, the Diet does not seem to have anything that is a big issue, but they seem to be having some trouble about the Formosan Rice Laws. As for the problem of the military, it does not mean that appropriations for this (military budget) cannot be found, but rather, that financial incomes which the government had expected to appropriate for this purpose, do not exist anymore. Moreover, military budgets which require appropriations for the period 1939, 1940 and 1941, will be deleted from the general budget and be financed as treasury obligations to the extent of ¥ 700,000,000 under the form of (munitions)-contracts; ¥ 600,000,000 will be appropriated from reserve funds; and consequently, approximately ¥ 1,300,000,000 will be taken off from the general budget."

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The Premier continued: "Another thing, there have been altogether too many rumors. It seems that when Prince KONOYE meets anyone, no matter how wrong a statement might be made he (KONOYE) will not deny it. Such a thing is very distressing, isn't it?" Then I (HARADA) said to the Premier: "The Prince (SAIONJI), in thinking over the matter pertaining to KONOYE's contemplated trip to the United States, is of the opinion that for the sake of KONOYE's future, not as an individual, but when he again serves His Majesty, it would be very vital if he should know as many fine, foreign friends as possible, especially in Europe and the United States. From this standpoint, as soon as the opportune moment comes, that is when he (KONOYE) has more time on his hands, it would be a good idea for him to go to the United States and make some good friends and return. The Prince (SAIONJI) has often spoken of how a sojourn in the United States might help toward developing a wider field of vision." To this, the Premier also assented and said: "To tell you the truth, I am also considering this matter. As the time, as well as the state of affairs, must be considered, I am thinking of looking further into the matter." The Premier appeared to be highly in favor of it (KONOYE's contemplated trip to the United States).

On the 4th, I went to Oiso and while resting a little on the 4th and 5th, I met Gen. TERAUCHI. He remarked: "A few days ago, I was invited by PICOTT (Military Attache to the British Embassy) and had dinner together with Gen. HATA and the British Ambassador. It is futile to have an Ambassador who is poorly informed, sent here." Wondering why he (TERAUCHI) made the above remarks, I questioned him and he answered: "The circles close to the English Ambassador are saying that action will be taken upon consultation and, as

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much as possible, efforts will be made to carry out matters without hampering Japan. However, they should go still further and say that anything pertaining to the East, particularly that which concerns China, will be left in your (Japan's) care. Your (HARADA) group has too much regard for the feelings of Great Britain and the United States; therefore, such a problem arises." He (TERAUCHI) sounded like TAKUMO Dempo, for he repeatedly stated the following: "The actions of the officials of the Imperial Court are inexcusable. MAKINO's actions are unpardonable." Therefore, I sternly remarked: "I (HARADA) would like to have you be more prudent in your speech pertaining to such matters (Imperial Court)." To this, TERAUCHI replied: "Well, I shall refrain from mentioning the Imperial Court." Nevertheless, as it would be embarrassing to have him (TERAUCHI) talk like a vagrant, I later cautioned him again.

Very early in the morning of the 6th, I went over to the Prince's (SAIONJI) residence and from about 9:30 to 10:30 am, made a report of the latest developments. Then, I returned to O and rested for awhile. From 6 o'clock I went to Prince HOSOKAWA's residence in Tokyo where Prince CHICHIBU and Prince TAKAMATSU were assembled, and together with MONOYE, KIDO and MATSUDAIRA, enjoyed dinner and discussed miscellaneous topics until about 11:30 pm, after which I returned home.

On the morning of the 7th, I attended the House of Peers. At noon, I invited Commercial Attache SUDO over to the Tokyo Club and listened to his observations of his stay in Berlin, his actual experiences, and the situation between the Army and the German authorities. This get-together was centered around members of the Koseikai of which ten were invited, together with SAKAI and OKABE of

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the Kenkyukai and HOSOKAWA of the Kayokai. We all had lunch together and listened to what he (SUDO) had to say until about 3:30 pm.

He (SUDO) spoke of OSHIMA, the Ambassador to Germany whose actions are hard to distinguish between being German or Japanese. Citing examples, he also spoke of the Embassy employees whose minds became spell-bound when they went to Germany and did everything as Germany proposed. On the other hand, SUDO praised the general modus operandi of Germany—for example, the development and effort put into completely cutting off communication with the outside world by HITLER and GOEBBELS. But, whether or not Germany can continue to push this thing thereafter, is questionable, according to his (SUDO) opinion. As to the resignation of SCHACHT, his opinions coincided with ours. At any rate, Germany's attitude toward England is, to be sure, very respectful and cordial and the younger Nazi circle is saying: "At some time in the near future, there will be a battle between the white race and the yellow race; in other words, a battle of races. And, (Germany) will join hands with England." The foregoing is the existing situation (in Germany).

Again, Germany is trying to obtain something in China and might utilize Japan in attaining its objective. The fact that Germany tried to have Japan bring ¥ 100,000,000 worth of its gold (to Germany) is an extreme underrating of Japan on the part of Germany. SUDO was very enraged over the foregoing saying that it resulted from Japan taking too much of a slavish and submissive attitude. When he was told to send over ¥ 100,000,000, SUDO replied that from the standpoint of his duties, he could not very well convey this request and finally cast the matter aside. SUDO further

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stated that when he refused to do anything about the foregoing and he was subjected to pressure by the military.

He was deeply impressed at HITLER's popularity, his efforts and earnestness, but had great doubts as to how long it would continue and whether he (HITLER) could carry matters through with such a policy. It seemed that Vice Minister YAMAMOTO did not know of later developments.

On my way to Tokyo on the morning of the 9th, I (HARADA) had Captain TAKAGI ride on the same coach with me from Chigasaki. When I questioned him about the situation, he was very much concerned from the standpoint of having all agencies involved in the matter come to an understanding.

Upon my arrival in Tokyo I went to the House of Peers and told the Premier: "I was on the same train with Captain TAKAGI of the Navy (Ministry) Secretariat. If you intend to hold a conference in connection with the reply (to be made to ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI), it is best to have all agencies come to a preliminary understanding of matters through negotiations. This is because it would be very inconvenient should the Navy and the Foreign Ministries get together and oppose the Army after the conference is convened. The foregoing is what (Captain TAKAGI) more or less advised. Of course, I am positive that you are aware of this, but nevertheless, I thought I'd mention it to you." To this, the Premier replied: "Just the same, it is my intention not to take up this matter during the present session of the Diet, but settle it after the session is adjourned."

When I met the Foreign Minister shortly after lunch, he said: "There is no problem as far as the different agencies coming to an understanding are concerned. In short,

it is a pending question which, after careful discussion has already been reported to the Emperor and His Majesty, stating that it is an inevitable consequence of circumstances, has sanctioned it. Therefore, no matter what they (Ambassadors to Rome and Berlin) might say, the (Japanese) Government cannot cancel its decision. All we have to do is change the Ambassadors if they are going to rush to conclusions and say that the decisions (of the Japanese Government) will not do. As for the transfer of Ambassadors, I would like to carry it out after the close of the present session of the Diet. In all cases, we wired back instructions to both (Ambassadors) to do as recommended by the Japanese Government. In all likelihood, the Premier is of the same opinion."

On this day, the Premier proceeded to the Palace at 1:30 pm and reported to the Throne regarding the (Russo Japanese) Fishery Problem. With the bidding date, the 15th, close at hand, His Majesty was reassured that we (the Japanese Government) had an unshakable determination to take suitable retaliatory measures.

On his way home, the Premier stopped over at the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal's place and related his resolution, identical to that of the Foreign Ministry in connection with the strengthening of the anti-Comintern Pact. The Premier also said that it would be embarrassing if this (his above opinion) leaked out to the public. He further stated that he intended to settle the matter after the Diet. The foregoing was conveyed to me (HARADA) by the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. As a result, I was somewhat concerned as to the problems that will arise following this, but the Government (Japanese) expects to restrain the two Ambassadors with a very firm hand.

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Chapter 318
(23 March 1939)

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Translated by Miss Chito Isonaga

The Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal said: "His Majesty, the Emperor, confidentially told his Chief Aide-de-Camp: 'This is especially intended for you alone, but should the Army try to push through the request (of the Ambassadors to Rome and Berlin) in connection with the strengthening of the anti-Comintern Pact which was settled by the Five Ministers' Conference, it might lead to consequences which will mean a change of Cabinet since the Foreign Minister, as well as the Premier, will absolutely refuse to agree. This will be a grave question; therefore, I (His Majesty) want you to bear this in mind. With this in mind, go over to the General Staff Headquarters and the War Ministry, to look over the situation and return.' This has happened many times up until now and caused His Majesty deep concern. But, there have been many instances where knowledge which His Majesty ordered not to be disclosed, has been brought to the attention of the person concerned and, on the other hand, what His Majesty gave specific instructions to be carried out, not executed. As Chief Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty, one can say it is an unpardonable act, but nevertheless, it is very embarrassing." The foregoing appeared to be the opinion of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.

The day after His Majesty spoke (to His Chief Aide-de-Camp), MACHIJI, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau came over to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and inquired if it would be possible to conclude something in the line of a Tripartite Military Pact without causing a change in the Cabinet. As the attitude of MACHIJI, the

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Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, was very impertinent, it seems that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal quite severely reproved him (MACHIJIJI) in regard to the Army's modus operandi as well as the attitude of the two Ambassadors. Therefore, MACHIJIJI left the office with an unhappy countenance.

On the 11th, I (HARADA) met SAWADA, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, and he remarked: "If the Premier is truly of the same opinion as that of the Foreign Minister, I would like very much to have him advocate the fact that he is in accord with the assertions made by the Foreign Minister at the Five Ministers' Conference. The foregoing was not exactly said with displeasure by the Foreign Minister exclusively for the Premier's benefit, but it is vital that the Premier speak up so that it will keenly effect the rest of the Ministers. IWAKIRI Shigeo together with KABAYAMA Sukehide, is supporting YAMAMOTO Eisuke as Premier of the succeeding Ministry. This is a movement to have someone represent Kagoshima (Prefecture). There are others who are supporting Gen. HAYASHI, and of course, there are others who are backing Gen. MIYAMI."

In the afternoon, I went to the Diet and met the Premier. He said: "In the matter of the fishery issue, there is a chance for a compromise to be concluded. The Polish Minister called on Foreign Minister ARITA and reported that the Soviet Union would like to hold the auction between the 15th and the 27th. In other words, the Polish Minister conveyed the Soviet request as information intimating that Russia wanted the deadline which is the 15th, extended to the 27th. ARITA calculated that it would affect the Soviet more if he were a little severe with his reply; therefore, he told the Polish Minister that if Russia intended to carry out matters without bending their claims, it might be that

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under certain circumstances, Japan might have to resort to military force."

In regard to the internal affairs (of Japan) after the close of the Diet Session, the Premier stated: "It might be necessary to change the set-up of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Finance Ministry. In other words, I think there is a necessity to conduct a certain type of reorganization." Saying this, the Premier seemed very much worried over the movements of the IZAWA faction. The Premier further stated: "As for the relationship with the United States, it is my intention to make it as favorable as possible."

I left on the evening of the 11th for Okitsu. It happened that the Prince developed a fever due to bronchial pneumonia. Therefore, we constantly awaited the report of his condition. I remained in Okitsu until the morning of the 14th. Fortunately, the Prince's recovery was remarkably rapid and by the morning of the 14th, his condition was so favorable that I was able to return home. This time I did not report to the Prince.

I had breakfast with KONOYE at Atami and then returned to Oiso a little after 12 o'clock noon. KONOYE said: "I met KAO Tsung-wu not long ago, but the situation looks difficult. Moreover, I have received a letter from WANG Ching-wei but..... KUHARA came over yesterday and talked for four hours. In short, he incessantly spoke ill of former Finance Minister IKEDA, and of the fact that the concept of 'one party, one nation', was not counter to the national policy. That fellow does speak with a kind of reasoning." To this I (HARADA) replied: "I am of the opinion that it is not wise to meet with a person like KUHARA for even a short while. Therefore, your (KONOYE) seeing him

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for four hours is beyond my comprehension. You are just giving him an opportunity to increase his influence. In other words, I think it would be a good idea for you to refrain from giving him an opportunity to increase his influence; that is, encourage and endorse his social as well as political existence." To the foregoing KONOYE replied: "I could not very well refrain from meeting him and I could not show a bold front also."

On the evening of the 14th, I had business in Tokyo. Therefore, I returned and at 9 am on the 15th, went over to the Navy Minister's place and met with the Vice Minister. After talking with him on various subjects for more than an hour, I went over to the Diet Building. The Navy Minister said: "The Premier has been repeatedly saying: 'It is very annoying as KONOYE reveals top secret information to newspaper reporters. As a result, the Foreign Minister, in particular, has been put to trouble.' I believe the Soviet problem (Fishery Issue) will be settled shortly."

Then, I attended the Diet and as I still had time, met with the Premier and spoke to him of the Prince's (SAIONJI) illness. Premier HIRANUMA stated: "It is really embarrassing as KONOYE reveals top secret information to insignificant news reporters. He must discipline himself a little." I (HARADA) mentioned KONOYE's pending trip to the United States. Moreover, the Premier remarked: "In connection with the successor to the Presidency of the Privy Council, Vice President HARA might be all right, but it will take two or three years before he could attain any prominence." As for the Soviet Fishery Issue, the Premier expressed the same conviction as that of the Foreign Minister. As for the strengthening of the anti-Comintern Pact, he (Premier) remarked: "To rely on Great Britain and the United States to

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an extreme, is not very wise. Of course, at the same time, we cannot rely on Germany and Italy. In short, there is nothing else we can do but to take the middle road; the so-called voluntary diplomacy. The Army personnel is so simple-minded that they are easily fooled by others."

On the way home, I saw KIDO in the Cabinet room and spoke to him for a while. He stated: "It is very distressing that KONOYE reveals all kinds of stories to the newspaper reporters. All the newspapermen are saying that they heard it from KONOYE. As a matter of fact, even I was shocked to think that he spoke to them of such matters. When the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal called on KONOYE at his main residence in Ogikubo, it served as an incentive to the newspaper publishers. Calculating that something vital might have occurred, they rushed in large numbers to Atami where a joint news conference was held. At that time, it seems that KONOYE spoke diversely of matters pertaining to KAO Tsung-wu and the anti-Comintern Pact, going so far as to say the Japanese Government had due resolutions on the above matters." I (HARADA) was very much surprised at this but did not reveal my feelings. "That is KONOYE's weakness," said KIDO, very much troubled.

I (HARADA) called KONOYE on the phone and said: "Upon my return home (from Okitsu), I have heard complaints from all directions that you have let information of vital importance leak to newspaper reporters. Be careful about this." To this KONOYE replied: "I have not said anything of that sort from my side. The newspaper reporters obtain information from the Army quarters and come to me with them. On the contrary, the situation is such that I have been taught things in detail. Please convey this to the Premier so he will understand matters clearly."

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As KONOYE told me the above, I made various apologies for him, but nevertheless, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal commented: "He (KONOYE) might say that, but if someone went and subjected him to persistent questioning, I am sure he would have said something to confirm the matter. The foregoing being the general observation, I called KONOYE once again and cautioned him on the matter.

I had dinner at the Kawana with the Foreign Minister and MATUDAIRA on the eve of the 16th and discussed the decision of the Five Ministers' Conference in connection with the strengthening of the anti-Comintern Pact as well as Germany's high handed attitude. ARITA seemed perturbed and said: "In short, the fact that our military personnel has been saying to the German Government that Japan cannot stand alone has caused much damage. This is why Germany always comes out in a high handed manner and our Army personnel swallows the whole matter without any reasoning. As I have said before, it is very distressing to have people such as Ambassador OSHIMA send wires which make it difficult to comprehend whether he is a Japanese Ambassador or a German one."

On the morning of the 17th, after the Diet session had ended, I went over to the Ministry of the Imperial Household and met with the Minister as well as MUSHAKOJI the head of the Bureau of Peerage and Heraldry.

In the afternoon I saw the Premier and asked him questions regarding the latest developments. The Premier said: "In spite of everything, the Five Ministers' Conference would like to settle matters as much as possible."

On the evening of the 17th, I was invited by TERAUCHI to the Kanetanka and upon my arrival there, MIZOGUCHI and MUSHAKOJI were present also. According to TERAUCHI's

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intimation, public sentiment seems to be against the present Cabinet.

That evening, I returned to Oiso and rested a day. The 19th being Sunday, I remained in Oiso and when I called the Foreign Minister, he remarked: "The weather is fine and as I have no bill coming up before the Diet which concerns me, I am thinking of going to Oiso to inquire after the health of TAKAGI." To this I replied: "It suits me fine, do come."

The couple (Foreign Minister and his wife) came over and went over to call on TAKAGI and also came over to see me. The Foreign Minister stated: "Aside from me, the four other Ministers are saying: 'Do not change the basic contents, but somehow modify the request of OSHIMA and SHIRATORI.' But, if this is done, the basic principles will become altered. Therefore, I asked SAWADA his opinions on the matter and he said: 'The fundamental ideas of the four Ministers are wrong. Therefore, it is difficult to make them understand.' If I (Foreign Minister) have a long talk with the Premier, I am sure he will understand. Therefore, when I return, I shall make it a point to see him."

As IKEDA was also in Oiso, ARITA and I went over to his villa and visited with him. We left on the same evening train for Tokyo as I (HARADA) had a wedding reception to attend.

Reporters of the Kokumin Shimbun, who spied ARITA and I on the same coach, spread the rumor that ARITA had called on Prince SAIONJI in the following day's headlines. Unfortunately, ARITA failed to report to the Police (before going to Okitsu). Therefore, his whereabouts were not known. At the same time, it happened that the Minister of War had an occasion to call on ARITA due to sudden business,

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and as he could not be located, it caused all kinds of rumor to be spread.

On the following day, when I attended the Diet, KIDO severely reprimanded me saying: "You have put us to much trouble." To this I (HARADA) replied: "I did not exactly invite him (Foreign Minister). The blame lies entirely on those who took advantage of the situation." Nevertheless, KIDO further stated: "At a time like this, one has to be very careful."

On the following day, when I went to the Cabinet Ministers' Office, I related what actually happened and everyone laughed over the incident. Nevertheless, the matter could not be completely forgotten.

I (HARADA) met the Premier on the 20th and he again mentioned that he was anxious to bring the Five Ministers' Conference to a conclusion.

I left for Okitsu on the afternoon of the same day and met the Prince on the 21st. Thereupon, I discussed the state of affairs pertaining to the Five Ministers' Conference. I also delivered a message from the Premier to the effect that he felt that the Diet will most probably end without being prolonged. To this, the Prince did not say anything special but he made a general comment: "I have no idea what they are doing in matters pertaining to both state and foreign affairs. I could make numerous criticisms..." Since the Prince had just recovered from an illness, I cut matters short and made my leave as soon as possible and returned to Oiso.

I called from Oiso and asked ARITA regarding the latest developments and he said: "As soon as the ceremonies ended at the Imperial Palace today (31st), I had a long three hours talk with the Premier and it seemed as though

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he did understand the situation. Nevertheless, he has somewhat softened and is accepting the turn of events. It is a perplexing situation."

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Chapter 319
(27 March 1939)

Premier's Faith in Arita

Translated by Miss Chito Isonaga

On the 22nd, ARITA said that he met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and carefully reported the situation to him and returned home.

On the afternoon of the same day, Col. KAGESA came to see me over at the Diet and stated: "All of the paper work is completed, but it is very regrettable that only the Foreign Minister will not compromise. It seems as though he is influenced by high officials close to the Emperor." He (KAGESA) did not mention Prince SAIONJI's name, but linked my name in particular, with the above. Therefore, I remarked: "The Foreign Minister is not a man who is easily led by what high officials say, nor is he the type who is influenced by what we say. He is a man with a strong volition, therefore, not easily moved by such. I (HARADA) have associated with him for a long time and he has never mentioned Prince SAIONJI's name; therefore, your worries are in vain." Col. KAGESA repeatedly made various statements to the following effect: "The rightists are in action." He also stated that the Chief of the Metropolitan Police had said: "Peace cannot be maintained." Therefore, I answered: "Such stories are common and do not mean anything." With this, I sensibly cut short the conversation and made my leave.

On that very evening, the Five Ministers' Conference was held from 8:00 p.m. to 12:30 a.m. and the business settled. This was reported to me by ARITA. It was planned to

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continue along the line of the Tri-Partite Military Pact and settle matters without changing the basic principles. I (HARADA) decided to find out the details later. I also made up my mind to refrain from going too frequently to the offices of the Cabinet Ministers as well as that of the Premier, and in this way, mutually avoid embarrassing situations. I had this conveyed to Secretary OTA.

On the morning of the 23rd, the Premier proceeded to the Palace and reported on various matters to His Majesty. On his way home, he called on the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.

On that very day, Ambassadors KOBATA and SATO came over to my place and had lunch. Ambassador KOBATA seemed very much concerned over the recent events and at the same time, expressed his desire to have KIDO notified that he would like to see the Minister of Home Affairs to protect ARITA from the rightist campaign against him. Ambassador SATO was likewise concerned over the recent events and said much, but what he said coincided (with Ambassador KOBATA). At the same time, he commented that nothing could be done at present. Both left after talking until 3:00 p.m.

Later, when I spoke on the telephone with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, he said that His Majesty remarked: "Well, the situation was unavoidable but it is necessary for me to see it in writing. Therefore, have them present me the papers. They tell me that the Foreign Minister agreed to the proposal."

In the morning of the 24th, I met the Navy Minister at his official residence and also spoke on various matters with the Vice-Minister. I then met KONOYE and had lunch with him. KONOYE remarked: "I have heard that

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Chief Secretary TANABE is resigning as a result of great dissatisfaction." Therefore, I (HARADA) inquired: "What are the reasons?" To this, KONOYE replied: "It is because the Premier listens too closely to what the higher official circles have to say." I cautioned KONOYE saying: "I do not know where you heard it, but regardless, such a thing is done with the intention to influence a person against another and for defamation purposes. Therefore, listen to such talk with discretion."

In the evening, I went to the Diet and met Secretary OTA. I said: "There are all kinds of maneuvers, from all directions, taking place. Therefore, I am of the opinion that it would be wise for the President of the Privy Council to take notes of the actual state of affairs of the government as he finds it, for there might be occasions for its use. Furthermore, in order to accomplish the foregoing, it would be wise to contact KONOYE." To this, Secretary OTA replied: "As I was thinking of doing just that, I will carry it out."

On the 25th, I met Captain TAKAGI and I received the official orders of the Foreign Minister which was referred to the Five Ministers' Conference in connection with the strengthening of the anti-Comintern Pact.

When I attended the closing ceremony of the Diet on the 26th, ENDO Ryusaku handed me a letter and told me to read it. Upon reading it, I found out that it was a letter from a certain party to ENDO and it was divided into three paragraphs.

The first said that the causes for the present China Incident were illogical from the very beginning and the recognition of one's duty to one's sovereign was

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established both in the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars, as both wars were waged in the interests of peace, but there is nothing like that in the present incident.

Another thing, the most proper way of carrying out matters is none other than to conclude an economic alliance with England, instead of getting together with Germany and Italy. And, with Japan and Great Britain as the nucleus, the United States should also be invited to aid in the settlement of the China situation. Then, it can be seen that Japan fought to establish peace in the East through the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars and the present incident. The basic reasons should be that Japan has always, from the beginning to the end, strived for peace in the Orient and that this will lead to world peace.

The public claims that the 10,000,000 pound loan to China by England is a concrete evidence of aid to CHIANG Kai-shek, but this is not true. Japan should have taken advantage of the opportunity at the time when England sent an explanation to that effect and settled matters by shaking hands. It is not too late yet. It is to the advantage of Japan's future, if she would settle this serious situation even a day sooner while Europe is still in confusion. If matters are delayed and the situation in Europe settled, public attention might be concentrated on the East and Japan will be placed in a very tough spot. Something ought to be done. The foregoing was the substance of the letter.

ENDO also said: "Won't there come a time when the Army will be severely censured by UMEZU and his faction?"

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With the intention of learning the details of the foregoing from ENDO later, I parted with him then.

ARITA stated: "The initial attitude of the Premier towards me, in regard to this problem is very unsatisfactory. It is discouraging to have him (Premier) consult the Army first and me later, instead of frankly discussing everything with me in the beginning. Such problems are difficult for anyone to handle; therefore, unless he (Premier) admits me into his confidence, I shall not be able to continue in office."

OTA, the Secretary to the Premier, had remarked: "The Premier is very much in sympathy with ARITA's position. Again, I do not think that ARITA will ever resign, but I would like very much to have you convey the fact that the Premier has complete confidence in him to the Foreign Minister."

I mentioned the above to ARITA and he remarked: "Well, the next time you meet OTA, please explain matters very carefully to him. I could not understand the initial attitude of the Premier at all, but towards the end, he talked to me without reserve. If he had taken the latter attitude from the very beginning, we might not have stayed the way we have."

I (HARADA) reported to OTA that ARITA had said the foregoing and advised: "It is well worth taking such precautions in the future."

Likewise, in the case of Minister of Home Affairs, KIDO, I heard that the Premier had an air of constraint in connection with what certain groups were saying in an attempt to either estrange KIDO from SHIOWO's influence or to make KIDO resign. Therefore, I also spoke of this

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to KIDO as well as ARITA. As both KIDO and ARITA were old cabinet members, I felt that there was a lack of intimate cooperation and in spite of the fact that the parties concerned were aware of the situation, it seemed that both felt something wanting.

I left on the eve of the 27th for Okitsu and called on the Prince on the morning of the 28th. I made a general report of the latest developments. As the Prince (SAIONJI) still had a slight fever, he sat on his bed and remarked: "Well, you can't tell what they are trying to do, can you?" I mentioned that in spite of outward appearances of being friendly with Germany, there is, on the other hand, a strong argument prevailing to the effect that the situation between England and the United States must be improved. Nevertheless, the unthinking and uninformed mass is in favor of strengthening the anti-Comintern Pact with Germany and Italy or possibly, attack England by forming a military alliance with them (above two countries). In short, the anti-British fever is thoroughly spreading in all directions. Nevertheless, the financial world, as well as the learned, are absolutely opposed to these issues and are very apprehensive over the entire situation.

I returned home on the 29th and invited the Chief Civil Administrator of Korea, the Commissioner-General of Formosa, IWAKURA and MATSUDAIRA, together with KONOYE over for lunch at the Kuzana.

On the morning of the 30th, KONOYE stated: "It is a long time since we've golfed. Shall we have a game today?" Therefore, I went over to KONOYE's and together, we started off. We returned home in the afternoon and called at the official residence of the Premier around

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3:00 p.m. and met him for the first time after the close of the Diet session and exchanged civilities. The Premier stated: "There is a general talk of reorganizing the Cabinet, but I have no such plans. However, I am seriously considering replacing some Cabinet members. That is; appoint Chief Secretary TANABE as Minister of Communications. But, as there is no qualified person available as successor to the Chief Secretary, I am very much put out. First of all, we shall have to put into immediate actual practice all of the government measures that have been passed by the Diet. This is not an easy task." The Premier also inquired after the Prince's (SAIONJI) health, therefore, I gave him a general report.

In the evening, I was invited to dinner at the Shin-kiraku by the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Board. During the course of the conversation, the Chief said: "There are no outstanding problems prevailing. As for maintaining public peace, I am doing my utmost; therefore, set your mind at ease." It seems that the Chief of the Metropolitan Police goes over to see the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal quite often. He spoke as though he had formed a very good connection, but nevertheless, he (Chief of the Metropolitan Police) stated deplorably: "I am having a difficult time with the rightists and other such organizations. They are troublesome." At any rate, as he (the Chief of the Metropolitan Police) has had experience as Chief of the Public Peace Preservation Bureau, he is being mindful of all situations and assisting KIDO in this way.

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Translated by Lt. Larry Nishihara

I spoke with the Foreign Minister on the morning of the 1st at his official residence. He said: "It has been the accepted custom for the Premier to present a report of the Prime Ministers' Conferences to the Throne. Later, in the event of the necessity of further explanation on foreign policy matters, I would, of course, be called upon. However, it is customary for the Premier to give the complete report. When the Premier was granted an interview by the Emperor recently, the Emperor's first question was: 'Just what is to be done in the event that Ambassadors SHIRATORI and OSHIMA do not conform to the directives of our government concerning the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact?' The second question was: 'Will there be any more changes in the alliance?'

"The Premier's reply to the first query was: 'If the ambassadors fail to carry out the directives of the government, they will either be recalled or other appropriate measures taken. Since this is the final decision concerning the strengthening of the pact, there would be no alternative but to cut off negotiations in the event of any further changes. It is the intention that the details of the pact will be determined with the idea that effective military support cannot be rendered.'

"The Emperor again questioned: 'What is the significance of 'effective military support'? The Premier replied: 'Due to the existence of the treaty with Germany and Italy, Japan will not be able to maintain neutrality in the event that a state of war should exist between those two nations and another. Therefore, we must give them support other

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than military. We will not be able to go into actual combat, but we can dispatch naval craft to facilitate matters for Germany and Italy. In other words, I believe that we must do some demonstrating (of power) in order to restrain them (the enemies of Germany and Italy). However, it will be impossible to do such things as attacking Singapore or invading Europe.' The Emperor then requested that the gist of the replies on the first and second points be presented to him in document form. This matter was requested of the Foreign Minister by the Premier."

The contents of that document are as follows: First; in the event of failure to carry out the directives due to a difference in opinions, recall or other such appropriate measures will be instituted so that they (the two ambassadors) will not impede the negotiations. Second; if the negotiations fail regardless of the scope provided in the directives of Jan. 23 and March 25 (such as changes in our policy), they will be cut off. The foregoing was the gist of the document prepared for His Majesty and the signatures of the Five Ministers - those who attend the Five Ministers' Conference - appeared on it.

I left for Okitsu on the night of the 2nd and met the Prince on the morning of the 4th. After giving the Prince a report of the latest developments, I returned. Even at this date, the supplementing of the Cabinet; that is, in the posts of Chief Cabinet Secretary, Communications Minister and Minister of Overseas Affairs, had not progressed.

Before my departure for Okitsu, ARITA said: "I would like to have it arranged so that Admiral OKADA would speak with Navy Minister YONAI. Up until the present, I have gone along together with Finance Minister IKEDA and Navy Minister YONAI; but now, ISHIWATA has become the Finance

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Minister and Navy Minister YONAI has changed recently."

Therefore, I requested MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, to arrange it so that Foreign Minister ARITA could meet Admiral OKADA in order to talk over the situation and also to arrange it so that Admiral OKADA could speak with Navy Minister YONAI. At about this time, there were strong demands from Germany again and the Foreign Minister was quite worried about how to meet this situation.

On about the 6th, there was considerable talk of the supplementing of the Cabinet, and the news reporters were quite busy from the 6th until the morning of the 7th, with the rumors that Secretary OTA would be appointed the Chief Cabinet Secretary and that Gen. KOISO would be appointed the Minister of Overseas Affairs.

On the morning of the 7th, MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, came and gave me the following story of the situation abroad concerning the directives issued for the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact.

With the final directives in their hands, Ambassadors OSHI and SHIRATORI met with the Italian representative at Rome, and explained them. The reply was that it was impossible. CIANO said: "Such a weak attitude is disturbing. Is Japan going to participate in the war?" SHIRATORI replied that Japan would. CIANO then said: "That settles the basic problem. However, we have never contended that Japan dispatch troops to Europe, but if that is the determination, that is fine. A generalized explanation should be made to the other nations. It would be very troublesome to have Japan make a special explanation. Other than to say that

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Germany and Italy are advocates of the defensive principle, no other explanations will be made. There need not be any worry because a generalized explanation will be given."

Since RIBBENTROP could not make it on the 2nd, just the documents were presented to him that day. RIBBENTROP met the Ambassadors on the 3rd and the same things were said to him. However, it seemed as if there had been some communication between the two nations (Germany and Italy). RIBBENTROP mentioned the same things and said: "Is Japan to participate in the war." OSHIMA replied: "Japan will probably participate." RIBBENTROP then said: "An explanation similar to that of Germany and Italy must be made. A greater portion of the secret agreement will be transferred to the treaty." This was generally similar to the German Plan sent to us in August of the past year and OSHIMA did considerable explaining. Finally, RIBBENTROP said that he would consult HITLER and left.

RIBBENTROP was again met on the following day and he said: "When I explained matters to HITLER, he said that is fine if participation is Japan's decision. That must have been the result of great controversy in Japan. Just so Japan is of such a spirit, there need be no squabbles over the minor details. However, Japan must give the same sort of explanation as Germany and Italy. Japan's plan is acceptable." Foreign Minister CIANO, in Italy, was immediately called on the phone and it was settled that this was also acceptable to Italy.

Now a great problem arises over the fact that Japan must make the same explanations as Germany and Italy. If such a thing is to be done, that would mean that Japan is ignoring England, France and the United States. Therefore, there should be some leeway on that point and if the same

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explanation is to be made, that factor would be lost. When it was said that Japan would participate, that did not mean that Japan's proposals would be altered. It is the opinion of the embassy circles, that it is favorable to agree, according to the situation. ARITA was very perplexed and his decision on that matter was not asked. It was said that Admiral OKADA had been instructed: "Please speak to YONAI. It is important that YONAI is not too greatly influenced by the Army."

On the 8th, ARITA called me (HARADA) and said: "I have something more to say to Admiral OKADA. Please ask MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to come over for a short while." Therefore, I called MATSUDAIRA and told him to make the necessary arrangements for the meeting (of ARITA and OKADA).

ARITA said: "I am very glad because things have been going very harmoniously with the Navy Minister recently. Since I have a few more things to say to Admiral OKADA, please speak to MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, about it over the phone for me." Therefore, I (HARADA) informed MATSUDAIRA of this and it appears that MATSUDAIRA went to see Foreign Minister ARITA and had visited Admiral OKADA the following day.

When I spoke to Admiral OKADA over the phone, he said: "I plan to meet Navy Minister YONAI, but it has been impossible to arrange the time for such a meeting. Therefore, I spoke with him over the phone and YONAI said: 'I understand. I shall do my very best.' I plan to call him on the phone again this morning." I (HARADA) told OKADA: "Since there is a Five Ministers' Conference this morning at about 10:30, I wish that you would speak to him again." OKADA said that he understood and hung up.

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Two or three days previous, Gen. KOISO had been appointed to the post of Overseas Affairs Minister; Chief Secretary TANABE had been appointed the Communications Minister; and Secretary OTA had been promoted to Chief Secretary. Since the Cabinet was quite settled because of these events, I thought that I would speak with the Premier. Therefore, I went to the official residence of the Premier at about 1:00 pm on the 8th. Although the Five Ministers' Conference had begun this morning from 10:50, it had not adjourned yet. I waited for approximately an hour. At about 2:00 pm, the conference ended and the Foreign Minister immediately went to the Palace.

When I met the Premier, he said: "It was decided that the directives will be issued. If those abroad do not carry out the government's directives, they must either be transferred or recalled. In connection with the China problem, Ambassador KERR told KODAMA Kenji in Shanghai: 'CHIANG Kai Shok is in a predicament and desires peace.' There have been declarations, such as that by the KONOYE Cabinet, to the effect that CHIANG will not be recognized. However, there is no doubt as to the leadership of CHIANG and if some arrangements can be made, it is desirable that the conflict be ended with the recognition of CHIANG. In the place of a foreign market, I intend to organize something in the nature of a trade board to work hand in hand with the price control commission."

After I left the official residence of the Premier, I went to meet the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. He said: "I cannot help but sympathize with ARITA in connection with the present problem. I really felt sorry for him. It was fortunate that the Navy Minister was very understanding." It was said that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal had been

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so concerned over the situation that he could not sleep for two or three nights. The Emperor, too, had been very concerned over the situation and he had even expressed his desire to cancel his trip to Hayama on the 11th, but he was advised that he should not abandon it and it was finally arranged so that he spent a week in Hayama.

I (HARADA) went to Oiso later and rested because of great fatigue. I visited IKEDA on the afternoon of the 9th and he said: "It seems as if it is the intention of the Premier to negotiate with CHIANG Kai Shek with the conditions of an anti-Comintern program. It also seems as if HASHIMOTO Tetsuma and the like at the Shiunso (rightist association) are ardently advocating pro-British arguments."

I went to Tokyo on the morning of the 19th and met Vice Minister YAMAMOTO at the official residence of the Navy Minister. I (HARADA) said: "The Premier has said that the Army has returned to the right path these days." The Vice Minister said: "When one mentions being on the right path, it is meant that work is channeled through the minister, vice minister, bureau and section chiefs. However, when the actual situation is that men such as the vice minister and bureau chiefs, without approval from the minister, independently go to meet the Premier, it cannot be said that the right path has been regained."

The Vice Minister continued: "The Navy Minister told the Premier: 'If there is no other great figure in China but CHIANG Kai Shek, then there is no alternative but to begin negotiations with him in order to bring matters to a close. If this is to be the policy, then the first requirement will be that he must cease his anti-Japanese efforts. In order to show his sincerity in this matter, he must rid himself of the Communist elements close to him by the

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execution of a coup d'etat, or something in that nature. After the negotiations have been completed, it is up to the Chinese whether CHIANG steps down from his post and takes a trip or again resumes his post. At any rate, it is essential that negotiations be opened with CHIANG and matters be brought to a close (peace be concluded between China and Japan).'

"In connection with the problem of the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Navy Minister has been opposed to a military alliance and had said: 'Since Ambassadors SHIRATORI and OSHIMA are that way, the government must issue directives with the main points clearly emphasized. If, by chance, Japan and Russia commenced hostilities and England and France came in on the side of Russia, then Japan must take up arms against England and France just as she did against Russia. However, if England and France were engaged with Germany and Italy, and Russia should come in on the side of England and France, there is absolutely no necessity of Japan becoming involved in war with Russia. It is necessary that these two points be clear.'

"These two points were clarified to the Premier by the Navy Minister. In addition, the Navy Minister advised the Premier: 'For example, if Italy goes to war against France and England, we will not be able to destroy British naval units in the Orient to give them succor even if this were requested of us. We may be able to offer them a demonstration of our fleet or such facilities as supply of fresh water and points to replenish supplies, but we cannot accord an effective support exceeding this. It is imperative that we make this point clear.'"

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Chapter 321
(18 April 1939)

Emperor Criticizes Envoys

Translated by Lieut. Korry Seino

The evening paper of the 11th mentioned that the War Minister had gone to the Palace from about 2:00 to 3:30 p.m. I was worried about this, so early on the morning of the 12th, I went to the private residence of MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and asked: "What was the reason behind the War Minister's visit to the Palace yesterday?" He answered: "I must go quite far back about this matter. On the 10th, when the Foreign Minister was received in audience after the Five Ministers' Conference, the Emperor asked him about the progress of the meeting. Prior to this, the Emperor knew of the opposition to the governmental directive by SHIRATORI and OSHIMA. Consequently, the Emperor thought that it was highly unforgivable for OSHIMA and SHIRATORI to overstep the limits of their authority and say that Japan would participate in war (with Germany and Italy). The Emperor was also aware of the fact that the War Minister was covering up, to the certain extent, such action of the representatives abroad, at the Five Ministers' Conferences. With these thoughts in mind, the Emperor asked the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal: 'I am thinking of calling in War Minister and rebuke him. Just what is your opinion?' The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal replied: 'Because the opinions of the War, Foreign and Navy Ministers as well as the rest of the Cabinet members agreed, as a result of conferences, and as this matter is already closed, I think it will bring about irritation to rebuke

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the War Minister by calling up the matter anew. It is entirely different from Changkufeng Incident this time, so I think it wise not to call in the War Minister to rebuke him.' The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal himself thought that the matter had been closed, it was wiser to let matters alone. That was the reason for a reply of such a nature. The Emperor said: 'If so, then I will not.' Thus, the Emperor abandoned his idea of rebuking the War Minister.

"On this same day, the War Minister went to the Palace in connection with some other matter and was granted an audience. The Emperor mentioned the matters which were disagreeable to him, but he did not say them in anger. The Emperor's words were to the effect of: 'In the first place, it is an infringement upon the supreme authority of the Emperor for the two ambassadors to express intentions of participating in war, a matter beyond them to discuss. Under such circumstances, I do not think it very favorable for you to take the attitude of supporting them. This also applies to your covering up for them at the Cabinet conferences.'

"The War Minister left the Palace in great awe and went to the room of the Chief Aide-de-Camp. The War Minister asked: 'Who could it be that told everything to the Emperor?' He was very angry about it. Upon hearing this remark, the Chief Aide-de-Camp went to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and told him about it. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal told to the Chief Aide-de-Camp: 'The words of the Emperor today, were not in the nature of a rebuke to the War Minister. Rather, the Emperor had merely mentioned point over which he was dissatisfied. It is very

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regrettable that they were construed in such a manner.'

The Chief Aide-de-Camp appeared to have understood."

Since the story was such, I (HARADA) told the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal: "This story should be told to the Foreign Minister, for it will be most embarrassing if he were to be asked something at the Cabinet meeting or even at some other occasion. Furthermore, it will be much better for him to know of this matter. There is need to have the Foreign Minister informed of such matters." MATSUDAIRA called up Foreign Minister right away and told of this incident. With his (Foreign Minister's) understanding, the matter was closed.

Early on the morning of the 13th, I went to see the Foreign Minister at his private residence and spoke about MATSUDAIRA's instructions of yesterday, etc. The Foreign Minister said: "On the afternoon of the 8th, I went to the Palace and was granted an audience with the Emperor. I reported on the decision of the Five Ministers' Conference. I also reported: 'Ambassadors SHIRATORI and OSHIMA have stated that Japan will participate (in war) in the event that England and France fought with Germany and Italy. They have clarified the position of the Empire by the expression of their own personal opinions without regard to the intentions of the government. Their statements should be rescinded as actions overstepping their limits (as Ambassadors). However, because of the fear that this would cause blows on their honor and lead to other complications, 'participation' should be interpreted in a broader sense, and taken to mean effective and appropriate actions other than military support. By such a means, I believe that it would be much wiser not to

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persecute the ambassadors' overstepping their limits."

The Emperor answered: "The action of the Ambassadors ignore the supreme authority of the Emperor." When I heard this, I didn't know what to answer. After I returned, I did not mention this matter to the Premier nor to the other members of the Cabinet; I just kept it to myself. I feared that it may create various rumors or be used as adverse propaganda if this was mentioned to the Premier."

On the morning of the 15th, I called on IKEDA Seihin and YUKI, the Governor of the Bank of Japan. IKEDA said: "The Premier must get a hold of himself. I wonder if he knows about the situation." YUKI said: "I met the Premier and he said: 'It is unavoidable because it seems to be the fashion to be pro-German. Matters cannot proceed along the lines of the senior statesmen's opinions.' This is a very troublesome matter."

When I met ARITA on the 16th, he said: "We are trying our best to write it up, but it will probably take two or three more days."

On the morning of the 17th, I called the Chief of the Metropolitan Police and told him that I would like to see him. He said: "It would be conspicuous for you to see me now. You are very closely watched by the public, so you must be very careful for awhile. The other day, Col. IWAKURO came to me and said: 'Couldn't you improve the situation?' He was very indignant about it. Therefore, I took IWAKURO to see the Minister of Home Affairs and let him talk directly. It seems that the conversation between them bore good results. The Chief Cabinet Secretary and Communications Minister IWABE were asked several times to submit a report of the domestic situation

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to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Rather than submitting the report, I wanted to talk the matter over with the Home Affairs Minister since I was under his jurisdiction, and that was the reason why I sent IWAKURO of the Army who was causing all this trouble to see the Home Affairs Minister."

Since I was watched that closely, I thought it bad policy to visit ARITA publicly, so I met him at the wake services for SAITO (footnotes on margin of original document: the remains of Ambassador SAITO returned from United States aboard a battleship on 17th April). Col. IWAKURO had also sent a man to ARITA to urge the establishment of the military alliance. They desired ARITA's cooperation on the matter. ARITA said: "I cannot do any more; let it be compromise or anything else. Furthermore, the situation is favorable now so sit tight. I (ARITA) told this to them and IWAKURO seemed to be satisfied with my answer. IWAKURO had always supported Gen. KOISO but IWAKURO had been told by KOISO that the situation would not progress any further and that it was unavoidable. Therefore, IWAKURO has also calmed down. In any event, the decision of the Premier is important."

This morning over the phone, the Chief of the Metropolitan Police also mentioned: "I don't know what to do if the Premier is so inconsistent." I thought that this was very natural.

On the morning of the 18th, I talked with ARITA over the phone again. When I mentioned that I was to meet IKEDA before noon, he wanted me to tell IKEDA: "Encourage the Premier." ARITA added: "I have an appointment with Gen. KOISO this morning." It seemed as if matters are being settled the way ARITA wants.

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Chapter 322
(24 April 1939)

Emperor Opposes Army Plan

Translated by Lieut. Korry Seino

ARITA said: "I have an appointment with Overseas Affairs Minister KOISO at 9:30 a.m. on the 19th. I want you (HARADA) to tell IKEDA to encourage the Premier." Therefore, I (HARADA) had IKEDA come to the new residence of TAKAGI in Toriizaka at 10:30 a.m. on the 18th. MATSUDAIRA and I urged IKEDA to encourage the Premier and IKEDA said: "Since it is a very vital matter, I shall do my best and talk with the Premier."

On the morning of the 19th, when I met the Navy Minister and the Vice-Minister at the official residence of the Navy Minister, the Vice-Minister said: "After the conclusion of the intensification of the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Navy Minister looks as if he has aged greatly. It is very impudent of Communications Minister TANABE and the Chief Cabinet Secretary to say that the Premier and War Minister are very cooperative, but it is too bad that the Navy Minister and the Foreign Minister are at odds with the Premier and the War Minister."

When I went to Imperial Household Ministry on some business, I met the Imperial Household Minister. Although he has no direct connection with politics, he was very worried over the diplomatic problems.

On the morning of the 20th, I went to see KIDO and inquired into the situation. KIDO said that he had met the Premier on the previous day. He said: "The Premier appears to be in a dilemma between the Army and the Lord Privy Seal or the Emperor. The Premier seems to think

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that the Army's actions are righteous and he would like to settle matters according to their whims. For such a thing, the understanding and cooperation of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal is needed. Consequently, the Premier desired that the Emperor also gains this understanding and it is his objective to have me (KIDO) stand in the middle to arrange matters."

I couldn't understand the position that KIDO had taken. KIDO stated that although the main part of the Anti-Comintern Pact had already received Imperial Sanction, the Army wants to omit the part of the secret treaty; namely, the attached secret treaty which says that the treaty is only applicable to the Comintern, in other words, to Soviet Russia. However, the Emperor will not hear of it. Therefore, within the applicability of the treaty, the Army should arrange it so that we will not be involved in case Germany and Italy ever fought against England and France or other nations. However, both the Army and Navy, especially the Army, are saying that they desire the avoiding of being drawn into the vortex (of war), so that portion of the Treaty is quite safe. Such are the opinions of the Premier and others. KIDO also expressed the same opinion and during the conversation, he said that the present Emperor is a scientist and very much of a liberal as well as a pacifist. Therefore, if the Emperor ideas are not changed, there will exist quite a gap between His Majesty and the Army and rightist groups. In the later years of Emperor KOMEI's reign, the Shogunate completely changed the officials about the Emperor. Perhaps something along that line will occur. In order to lead the Army, but still making it appear as if we were being led

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by them we must also make it appear as if we understood the Army a little more. When I was told these things by KIDO, it was beyond my expectations, so I was tempted to oppose him, but kept quiet for I thought that it would not do any good to argue with him now. I was very indignant because I thought that KIDO and the like should lead the Army or the rightist groups to comply with the will of the Emperor. It should be their duty to do their utmost along that line.

Therefore, I told KIDO: "You and I are the ones who are most familiar with the situation. The cheap, unrepresentable rightist groups are running around with selfish rumours and creating such circumstances to give the power to a man of their choice. This is the factor behind the disunity of the Army and the unfavorable social predicament. These are the factors behind the present situation. I believe that you will be able to clear this basic evil in your position. However, since there is not much left to be done, and although it is extreme of me, I am thinking of possibly killing five or six of these men who will become obstacles in the future. It may cause you some trouble at that time, but that is not the problem."

KIDO said: "You shouldn't mention such extremes." However, I was so disgusted with KIDO's attitude that I mentioned such things. Before he left, KIDO very vaguely said: "I'll think about it some more, so don't worry. I want you to tell the Prince (SAIONJI) not to worry."

On the 20th, I left for Shizuoka on the Kanome (express train). On the train, I met Gen. ABE and listened to his opinions of the situation within the Army and of the War Minister. However, there was not very much of what I

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did not already know.

On the morning of the 21st, I talked over the phone with MATSUDAIRA, Foreign Minister ARITA and the Navy Minister. Then, I visited the Prince (SAIONJI) and related the latest developments. The Prince said: "The problem is not whether the coordination of the Army and Navy, is good or bad. It would be bad for the nation to let all the evil gather together. When the good and the evil confront each other, then that will make sense. If the Army is wrong, the Navy must maintain righteousness, then, a balance will be struck. Lately, it has looked very queer to me and Japan seems to be just a weak nation in the Balkans. What are they going to do? I can't understand it. I see that the small magazines and unknown newspapers often mention such matters as: 'The Premier and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal are very cooperative', or 'There never was the time as now when the Cabinet and the officials close to the Throne are working so harmoniously.' I wonder what they are trying to say?"

I told the Prince: "The Premier said that the Army is unified and on the right track." The Prince said: "I don't think so; it looks to me as if it is getting worse. I don't know what to do."

Before I left to come here, I called up the Premier and he had said: "I haven't much to say, but there is absolutely no such thing as the Cabinet resigning.

Although we are a little stymied with the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact, we will find a way out." I mentioned this to the Prince and he said: "I have nothing to say now." I had the same opinion, so I didn't say anything either.

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After this, I went to Shizuoka and attended the farewell party in honor of Governor YAMAZAKI who was newly appointed to the post of Chief of the Civil Engineering Bureau. I returned to Tokyo on the Kamome (express train) at 11 p.m.

That night, I happened to meet Gen. KOISO and talked matters over. I asked him: "I won't mention the details, but since there isn't anybody else in the Army, I want you to become a KUSUNOKI Masashige." He said something like: "That's right." It seemed as if KOISO was exercising caution and he did not express any extreme opinions about the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact. He further said: "In the Navy, the Minister, the Vice-Minister and the bureau chiefs are united. However, the General Staff and middle-rank officers have differences of opinions with the higher echelons (of Navy). I am very envious of the unification within the Navy and we (Army) cannot do anything."

On the morning of the 22nd, I met the Minister and the Vice-Minister at the official residence of the Navy Minister and talked the matter over with them. They seem to be very firm and intend to keep up a strong opposition to the opinion of the Premier and others.

That evening, I talked to KIDO over the phone, and advised him that from the standpoint of the unification of the Navy, he must arbitrate between the Navy Minister and the Foreign Minister in this problem for it may result in a bad situation. He (KIDO) said that he would consider matters very prudently.

At the wedding of one of my relatives, I met KIDO and ARITA. Therefore, I made arrangements at the Tokyo Club

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so that these two could have a long chat. It seems that the two went there on their way home and discussed matters. The following morning, when I called ARITA, he said that he had been somewhat relieved to find that KIDO understood his views.

Prior to this, it was said that KIDO conferred with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at his official residence between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m. on the 22nd, which was the day after the Emperor's return from Havana. The conversation according to KIDO's story was that Japan is resolved to continue without changing the present terms. We intend to make contact with HITLER through Ambassador OSHIMA and not to have the Premier do it directly. If this method does not work, the Cabinet will resign. Therefore, it was necessary to consider the aftermath of a change in Cabinets. Ultimately, they reached the point where a method 'B' will be used if method 'A' doesn't succeed. This will be done instead of trying to change the ideas of the Emperor or the opinions of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. On the other hand, it could be taken to mean that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal should explain to the Emperor that the resignation of the Cabinet might result if the Emperor did not give his sanction and matters were advanced along the former lines and the other party did not agree. This matter of the Cabinet's resigning because of the lack of the Emperor's sanction is something unavoidable. KIDO had informed the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal that such a threat-like statement to the Emperor was inexcusable; nevertheless, KIDO did say that. I (HARADA) also thought that this was a very regrettable incident and spoke about it to MATSUDAIRA. He seemed to be of the same opinion.

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I also mentioned this matter to ARITA when I phoned him and he concurred with my opinions. However, as a result of the conversation between ARITA and KIDO, ARITA said: "I believe that KIDO understands."

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Chapter 323
(5 May 1939)

Hiranuma Wants to Aid Axis

Translated by Lieut. Korry Seino

On the 23rd a Five Ministers' Conference was held but the business at hand could not be finished so it was continued on the 24th. When I called on KIDO on the morning of the 24th, he seemed to have changed his attitude and said: "There is no alternative but to recall the Ambassadors (OSHIMA and SHIRATORI). If this influences the peace and order within the nation, I'll do something about it and I can suppress the rightists myself."

When I saw IKEDA Seihin on the same day, he said: "England's diplomatic hands can be seen in the fact that it mentioned that the Orient will be excluded in the England-Russia Treaty."

On the 25th, after the Five Ministers' Conference, ARITA told me: "A request has come from the Ambassadors (SHIRATORI and OSHIMA) for their recall. Therefore, a discussion was held to decide on this matter. It was decided that notification be made directly to HITLER and MUSSOLINI through the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo, instead of using the Japanese Ambassadors stationed in Berlin and Rome."

I went to Okitsu that night. On the morning of the 26th, I called up Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO and he said: "It's better to take the position of being satisfied with the result whatever they may be after everything possible has been done." This idea was similar to that of the Navy Minister. Concerning this matter of doing every-

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thing possible, which has been touched on lightly before, Foreign Minister ARITA said: "Through the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo, the Premier will approach HILDER and MUSSOLINI with a general statement. The Foreign Minister will present the particulars of this problem to the Foreign Ministers of Germany and Italy. They will push this matter to the very end, but if there is opposition to the demands of Japan, negotiations will be cut off. If things cannot be arranged, that is unavoidable. This above was decided upon at the Five Ministers' Conference."

I met the Prince at 10:30 a.m. on the 26th and made a report of the foregoing. The Prince said: "Why, that will only cause more confusion. Japan is being treated like a little country in the Balkans by Germany and Italy. In the event that Germany and Italy fight against England and France, in other words, when Germany and Italy become the masters of the world, then we must realize that Japan will be suppressed worse than we are now. Even if we ally ourselves and emerge victorious, we will suffer a great loss. It's too bad that the government has no foresight at all."

Between the 27th and 30th, there were considerable movements in the domestic political situation about this problem. Because he feared that he might be considered too intimate with the men close to the Throne, KIDO was making it appear that he would go along with the Premier. As a result of meeting with ARITA, KIDO concluded that the men around Communications Minister TANABE, Chief Cabinet Secretary OTA and the Premier, taking a very superficial view of the Navy Minister's stand, are saying

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that the Navy Minister is the cog within the group that is attempting to ruin the Cabinet politically. Because of the viciousness of the rumor that the Navy Minister is involved in this political intrigue, KIDO was asked by CIA and TATE to meet the Navy Minister since it was the request of the Premier. Therefore, KIDO met the Navy Minister on the night of the 2nd. At this meeting, KIDO said: "Since you mentioned the existence of the rumor that this problem is being used to topple the Cabinet, the Premier is very concerned over it." The Navy Minister resented this very much and said: "If problems such as this bring about bad results, the entire responsibility of national defense will fall to the Navy. Therefore, this problem cannot be considered lightly. It is indeed distasteful to be considered to be of such ugly motives at a time when I am judging matters with such care." The Navy Minister had even called me (HARADA) about this matter.

I (HARADA) was told by KIDO that he returned with a clear understanding that the Navy Minister had said such things from the pure sense of responsibility, and he also informed the Premier. He had explained this fact to the men who had asked him (to see the Navy Minister), so the Cabinet members felt quite relieved about it. Overseas Affairs Minister KOISO had worried over the same thing and hurt the feelings of the Navy Minister by visiting him and the Foreign Minister.

On the 2nd, the Premier hurriedly went to the Palace and the Navy and Foreign Ministries were worried that the Premier might propose the matter alone. The fact of the matter was that the Premier had said to KONOYE, the President of the Privy Council: "I might do something

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entirely opposed to the will of the Emperor, but I can't help that. I'll be fully responsible for any actions." I was worried about this but I was told later by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal that the Premier had made a general political report and that he withdrew without touching on the problem of this treaty. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal asked the Premier, when he came for an audience whether he would present a report to the Throne before arriving at a final decision on this matter, and the Premier had replied that he would. Although the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal had not actually ascertained the differences in opinion between the Emperor and the Premier, it was said that the Ambassadors had not been recalled although it was the Premier's intention to do so; also that the Premier would oppose the opinions of the Emperor very slightly. In any event, there was nothing of exceedingly great importance.

The difference in opinion between the Premier and Foreign Minister was that the Premier had advocated support to Germany until now; therefore, he cannot say that Japan will declare herself neutral in the event something happened to Germany and Italy. Consequently, the Premier wanted to say positively to both governments that Japan will not remain neutral in case of war of Germany and Italy against England and France. However, Foreign and Navy Ministers' real intention was rather a favorable neutrality because the word 'not neutral' was very dangerous. The intention of the Premier was to clearly indicate that Japan will not be neutral. Therefore, it is a fact that the Premier and Army are united against the Foreign and Navy Ministries.

Considering the fact that SAKURAUCHI, the Agriculture

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and Forestry Minister, was very worried about this problem and had called on the Navy and the Army at the request of the Premier. I asked IKEDA Seihin: "Will you talk to President MACHIDA (Minseito) and ask him to explain this problem to SAKURAUCHI, the Agriculture and Forestry Minister." IKEDA replied: "Tomorrow at the meeting of the State Councilors, I'll talk to MACHIDA thoroughly and will also talk to SAKURAUCHI about the circumstances."

Though again it goes back to the story of the Premier and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the expression of the Premier was: "This matter of not remaining neutral is not dangerous because the Army, Navy and Foreign Ministries, the Five Ministers, all clearly understood that Japan cannot give military support and also that the object of the alliance is against the Comintern." It seemed that the Premier was having a difficult time in expressing his intentions because, deep inside, he still had the idea of supporting Germany and Italy.

At 8:00 a.m. on the 3rd, I went to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and called up Foreign Minister ARITA. I asked of the situation and he said: "Because the Army, Navy and Foreign Ministers don't agree on the choice of words, I wanted to see the Premier this morning. However, there isn't any opening until 1:00 p.m. so I made it for that time. For a few days, I was worried that the Navy or Foreign Ministries might suddenly propose something to the Emperor, but that did not happen. It is a fact that the Premier said that support will be given up to a certain extent on this problem but that military aid is impossible. Furthermore, the other party does not desire it. It is also understood that this pact will be applicable only to

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the Comintern. If the Premier is to tell HITLER and MUS SOLINI, through the German and Italian Ambassadors at Tokyo, that Japan will give support, he cannot say that Japan is to remain neutral. Therefore, he wants to say that Japan will not remain neutral in the event of an emergency. Concerning this, the Navy and Foreign Ministries say that although it is inexcusable, the Emperor also takes it to mean favorable neutrality. Although there is no such word in International Law to express this favorable neutrality, still the Premier wants to say not neutral. The word not neutral is very ambiguous and also uncertain. Because this can lead to grave consequences, the Foreign and Navy Ministries don't agree on this matter. This is the reason that prolongs this problem. Therefore, when the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal tried to ascertain what was to be reported to the Emperor, it seemed that the Premier would not deviate from his intention of supporting Germany and Italy. This was the determining factor behind it all, according to the story of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.

At 1:00 p.m. on the 3rd, the Foreign Minister and the Premier met. As the message of the Premier, the Foreign Minister said that Japan will always be the supporter of Germany and Italy. If the extent of the support is questioned, then the answer is that it is not military support. We will say that this problem is only against the Comintern. After that, I met the Navy Minister at 3:00 p.m., and the War Minister also came in the evening. On this, the Navy Minister and Foreign Minister agreed with the Premier right away, but the War Minister

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said that he would go back to the Ministry and reply tomorrow morning.

On the night of the 3rd, I left for Okitsu and I called Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO on the morning of the 4th and also talked to the Navy Minister. The Navy Minister said: "I met the Premier, but he is within the scope of our ideas. I talked to him very forcibly and the words 'neutral' and 'supporter', will not be used."

The Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal said: "It has been settled with the Navy Minister. The War Minister will reply this morning. I believe the other Cabinet members will also agree and the Premier will go to the Palace today and report on the matters which have been decided upon."

I called up the Foreign Minister because I wanted to know a little more of the particulars when I report to the Prince (SAIONJI) and he said: "This is all there is to it. The main part of the draft means that even though the Soviet may not be in it (the war), Japan has decided to give political and economic support to Germany and Italy and all possible military aid. It is the fundamental point of this alliance to give military support as mentioned, but it is impossible to give effective military support because of several factors, either now or in the future. However, it will be given when made possible by the change of said factors." I (HARADA) told him: "That boils down to the point that Japan will aid politically, but cannot give practical (military) support." Foreign Minister ARITA said: "In short, it is desired that the term 'favorable neutrality' be included but since the Premier desires to say that Japan will not remain neutral,

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it has finally become like this."

"About 10:30, I went to see the Prince (SAIONJI) and reported everything. The Prince said: 'Even in the event of a German victory and their emergence as the masters of the world, Japan will still be treated as a small nation in the Balkans. What is to be done in that event? And another thing; the reason why the Japanese Ambassadors and Ministers in Europe approved of the military alliance is because they are still in that atmosphere. It is no wonder that they think that way. However, when diplomatic moves are to be made with the general view in mind, it is wholly undesirable to look at matters from within this vortex. It is best to judge matters from a distance in a calm manner.'"

Concerning the Army and the Navy, the Prince said: "When KONOYE came here the other day, he said that he was vexed because the Navy will ask for a large appropriation right after the submission of an Army budget. Therefore, I (Prince) thought it was due to the lack of political wisdom, and told him that such was not the case and that a Premier should not say such things. A Premier must judge matters on a much broader sense. You must think of the balance of the Army and the Navy from a general point of view and must further consider the national necessity (of the strength) at that time."

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Chapter 324
(9 May 1939)

Arita and Hiranuma Disagree

Translated by Lieut. Korry Seino

On the morning of the 5th, SAKATANI, who had arrived from Peking, came and had breakfast with me. SAKATANI's conception of the European War was that it was an 'equalizing' movement. In other words, he said that the struggle was one between the 'haves' and 'have nots'; consequently, Japan must join the 'have nots'. I argued with him: Perhaps it is an 'equalizing' movement, but there is no necessity for Japan to join just because Germany and Italy are. Concerning the situation in North China, SAKATANI said: "Japan should take charge of the Tientsin concessions. There is no need for WANG Ko-min."

Early on the morning of the 6th, I went to ARITA's residence in Mejiro and he said: "As soon as I handed the Premier's message to the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo, I received an official wire from Councillor USAMI in Berlin. It was to the effect of: "I was requested by GAUSS, the Deputy Vice-Minister of the German Foreign Office to meet him. He said: 'Do you suppose Japan will agree on this draft? This has not been shown to Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP yet, so I don't know what he will say but I am showing this to you unofficially as of my plan.' Upon looking through the draft, it appeared to be written in a very indirect fashion and it is a draft re-written with the emphasis on the German demands which was refused by Japan. I (ARITA) have investigated the origin of this draft and it seems that it was submitted to the German Foreign Office through the attaches by the Japanese Army."

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This is outrageous and I won't be responsible if this sort of the conspiracy goes on." However, he did not show me the actual contents of the draft.

After this, without any relation to the Premier's message, there was a wire from Ambassador OSHIMA. It mentioned that Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP called up Ambassador OSHIMA at Berlin from Munich on the way to meet CLANO at Como, and questioned OSHIMA: "Then a contracting nation goes to war against another, and even if there is no military aid from Japan (original parenthetical note: German and Italy do not expect military aid from Japan. It is impossible for Japan to do so), would it be permissible to recognize Japan as being in a state of war?" OSHIMA had replied in the affirmative.

ARITA said: "It is indeed inexcusable for those abroad to propose such a thing as 'participation in war' and to reply in such a manner independently. A Five Ministers Conference is scheduled for tomorrow, but this matter will cause considerable difficulty for Premier HIRANUMA desires to support rather than remain neutral. There is no doubt that such matters have already been transmitted abroad by the Army, and if such is to be the case, I cannot assume the responsibilities of foreign policy."

I returned home and called up the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and told him of it. On the 7th, I went to Yokohama with MATSUDAIRA for dinner. In the midst of our dinner, the Foreign Minister called and said: "I would like to see you as soon as possible." Together with MATSUDAIRA, I went to visit the Foreign Minister from 9:00 p.m. and asked the results of the Five Ministers' Conference. It seemed that the Premier supported the

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the opinion of War Minister which is the answer of OSHIMA to RIEBENTROP that in the event of war between one of the contracting nations and another nation, Japan will be considered to have entered a state of war although there may not be any military support. The Premier expressed approval.

Foreign Minister ARITA said: "The Premier and other Ministers who attended the Five Ministers' Conference reported to the Throne that Japan will not participate in war. I must consider the responsibilities for such things and I cannot continue (in office) with the opinions of the Premier and the War Minister as they are now. The Navy Minister strongly opposed and the Finance Minister did likewise. The Five Ministers' Conference was adjourned and the decision postponed until the afternoon of the 9th. Right after the adjournment, I (ARITA) met the Premier and told him: 'I can't take the responsibilities of the foreign policy under these circumstances so I would like to resign.' The Premier said: 'That will show disunity and cause the Cabinet's resignation. We would all have to resign.' I then said: 'Since it is not good to change the Cabinet now, I'll resign myself with some other reason.' I made it clear that I was not aiming at the resignation of the Cabinet. I (ARITA) don't know what attitude the Navy Minister is going to take, but he was strongly opposed to my resignation. After the Cabinet Conference, we (Navy Minister and I) remained in the Ministers' room and talked awhile, but since it would be disastrous if it were thought that we were planning a conspiracy, I left the Premier's quarters right away."

I (HARADA) returned home about 12:30 (midnight).

Arita and Hiranuma Disagree

Early the next morning, I talked over the phone with Adm. OKADA and he said: "It is bad for the Foreign Minister to resign alone. He may not like it but it is necessary for him to remain and to see that the least damage will be done."

I also talked to Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO over the phone and he said: "It doesn't make sense to let the Foreign Minister or the Navy Minister resign alone when the Cabinet doesn't. It isn't pleasant to see the wrong win and remain after the right withdrew; therefore, unless the whole Cabinet resigns, the Navy Minister will stick to it. It is no use unless the entire Cabinet be changed at some time."

So I reported these matters to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal over the phone and I related this to KONOYE, too. Overseas Affairs Minister KOISO wanted to see me so I met him on the night of the 8th at my relative's home. We talked from 8:30 to 11:00 and first of all, KOISO said: "The development of China Problem, which so often mentioned by the Army; the reaching of the conclusion of the war as soon as possible; will be impossible without a tri-partite alliance. Because the men at the front are displeased with British and French aid to CHIANG Kai-shek, an alliance with Germany and Italy will alleviate their feelings somewhat. Then, it would be well to settle the China problem through the offices of England and France. Unless this is done, the men at the front will prove troublesome." Though this is his usual topic, Gen. KOISO said just about the same thing again.

After this, he talked about the situation of the Army, Navy and Foreign Ministries, but he only covered

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points already known to me. He asked: "What is the opinion of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal?" I replied: "Of course, he has his own views on politics and principles, but he will not voice them. His constant desire, in his capacity as adviser to the Throne, is a reasonable government which will not harm the Imperial authority. He will never interfere directly with politics nor express his opinions. During the process of our appeal or report to the Throne, he may advise the Minister concerned of means to correct any unreasonable matters. However, this is one way of giving aid to the Throne. I have never heard of the behaviour of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal exceeding the limit of the above mentioned nor is such a thing possible. Despite this fact, it is very odd to hear rumours flying that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal did this or did that. Furthermore, it is even more inconceivable to see that you are moved by such false propaganda. However, this happens to be true and you must be very careful about this point. Especially, if you have any political aspirations, you must act very prudently."

Concerning the message of the Premier, Gen. KOISO said: "The Premier says that Japan cannot give actual military support at present or in the future, but will give political and economic aid and any possible military support. There should be no objection to enter the war since the Premier said Japan is prepared to give any possible military support in the event of war. What is wrong with entering the war?" I told him: "If Japan enters, in the event of war between Germany-Italy and England-France, then United States will certainly join. Then, the Navy must take the whole responsibility of

Arita and Hiranuma Disagree

national defense. The Navy is moving very prudently because they are aware of the heavy responsibilities and if, as you say, Japan declared herself a participant, the ships sailing the Atlantic as far away as South America or the Mediterranean, which take care of our foreign trade, will be seized wherever they are. The power of the Imperial Navy does not even reach the (whole) Pacific and we must consider this carefully. Therefore, the Navy has been very careful and has opposed the matter of participation in war. If you know anyone in the Navy, I think you should talk over this matter with him.

"There are too many rumours. For example, I hear that there is someone in the background instigating ARITA to hold out so long, but I do not think there is such a thing. The friendship between ARITA and myself has lasted almost twenty years, but he has never attempted to flatter the Prince (SAIONJI). Further, I never found he said any excessive things, a fact which frequently occurs among others who come to see me. I believe there is no one cleaner (in actions) than ARITA in the Foreign Ministry. Therefore, I cannot believe what you say. I cannot believe that you don't know his character because of your long association with him prior to the Manchurian Incident when he was the Chief of the Asia Bureau and you were the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. I just want to mention this fact to you." He replied: "I believe it is the Premier's intention to settle this as soon as possible and cope with the political situation. So are the members of the Cabinet." I answered: "Of course that is true, however, I firmly believe it is not true loyalty to the nation to drag along the attendant

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problems so far as to gamble with the fate of the nation and to invite the danger of an unfavorable future. It may sound pessimistic, but I want you to consider this matter thoroughly." Overseas Affairs Minister KOISO and I parted at about 11:30 p.m.

After this, I spoke to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal of my meeting with KOISO and of the conversation between us, and I spoke of this meeting to ARITA also.

On the morning of the 9th, at about 8:00 a.m. Ambassador KOBATA came and he was worried over the diplomatic problems. I thought it advisable for him to speak to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, so I called MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to my home and let Ambassador KOBATA talk the matter over with him.

Yesterday (8th), I had informed the Prince (SAIONJI) at Okitsu of the general situation by mail, and again at noon on the 9th, I reported the same over the phone. I told the Prince: "I will go to Okitsu as soon as the situation here clears up."

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Chapter 325
(16 May 1939)

Army and Navy Disagree

Translated by Lieut. Korry Seino

On the night of the 9th, I met MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. He said:

"The Emperor asked the Chief Aide-de-Camp: 'Could the Army try to conclude (the negotiation) with the draft which was submitted to the Five Ministers' Conference, without changing it?'"

I called up the Deputy Chief of the Naval General Staff and asked him of the situation. He said: "The opinion of the Naval General Staff does not differ from that of the Navy Ministry. Both of us are still remaining steadfast."

I called Vice-Minister of the Navy YAMAMOTO over the phone and he said: "Yesterday, the Deputy Chiefs of the Naval and Army General Staff Headquarters met. The Navy steadfastly adhered to their demands, but the Army said they would reconsider a little more so it was decided that discussions would be held between the Navy and the Army General Staff Headquarters."

On the night of the 10th, KONOYE asked me over the phone: "I am leaving tomorrow so if anything happens, will you let me know at the destination? I have information in my hands that this problem is going to become quite difficult." I (HARADA) also talked over the phone with ARITA, but he did not have anything of importance.

On the morning of the 10th, I (HARADA) met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in his reception room and listened to his opinions. He said: "Yesterday, the Emperor said

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to Chief Aide-de-Camp USAMI: 'The Chief of the Army General Staff Headquarters desires an audience. I presume that the object of the audience is a strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact. If he ever mentions anything about participating in war, I will clearly oppose it. Therefore, I want you to let him know beforehand.' The Chief Aide-de-Camp faltered a little and was saying that it will be terrible to have conflict of opinions between the Emperor and the Army. Anyhow, he went to the General Staff Headquarters immediately. Despite this, the Chief of the General Staff Headquarters (Prince KAN-IN) came to the Palace and proposed the matter of participation in the war and the Emperor stoutly refused this. Even the Grand Chamberlain was worried that this incident may cause a political change, but of course, there will be no such thing. Premier HIRANUMA's attitude is indeed inexcusable. Because of his selfishness, he united with the Army and dared to push this problems through, but he failed. He intends to remain by transferring the responsibility of the supreme command and say that it was their opposition (which caused failure).

"Whenever the Emperor is confronted by such important problems, His Majesty always bears in mind: 'I possess the prerogative of the declarations of war and peace as the Commander-in-Chief, I control the supreme command. It is to force a problem without my prior approval or discussion.' Consequently, I heard that the Chief of the General Staff (Prince KAN-IN) was spoken to quite severely. Although I don't know the exact words of the Emperor, that is a fact."

Then, after the Five Ministers' Conference on the

Army and Navy Disagree

10th, I met Foreign Minister ARITA. He said: "After the Five Ministers' Conference, the Premier talked to me (ARITA) in a hallway and said: 'I am surely troubled because there is too great a difference of opinions with the Command Staffs. I want you to desist from resigning.' I told him that I will keep my resignation off until this problem settled down, no matter what the decision, and parted."

At the same time, I heard a story which was supposed to be that of Foreign Vice-Minister SAWADA. According to that story, which was something like an intermediate report, the Army should decide on actual participation (in war after a conference. If that is the case, non-actual participation may mean 'spiritual' participation. The Premier has often spoken of 'spiritual' participation and this must have originated around there.

Concerning the results of the Five Ministers' Conference of the 9th, the Navy Vice-Minister said: "The conference was opened at 2:00 p.m. First of all, the Navy Minister said: 'The GAUSS draft which we have now, did not come through legitimate channels. If we are to bring up this problem reasonably at this meeting, we have not received the official reply from Germany to the message of the Premier. This reply is the first problem here. It is a very strange matter to stick to the GAUSS draft disregarding this reply.' No one said anything about it and continued discussing the GAUSS draft again.

"The Premier considered that a reply to his message was unnecessary because the matter had already been solved when Ambassador OSHIMA had replied 'yes' when Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP had asked him whether it was all right

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to consider Japan a participant (in the event of war).

In other words, it was agreeable for Japan to be considered as ready to participate in the event of war between England-France and Germany-Italy. The Navy Minister emphatically explained, that if Japan enters the war, the supreme command (staff) of the Navy cannot be held responsible for the seizure of her ships on the high seas. The Premier seemed to be very much surprised to hear of this and said: 'If the high command of the Army sanctions participation and the Navy does not, that is if the high commands of the Army and Navy are not agreed, we can never progress. If the opinions of the high commands do not agree, then I must reconsider the matter with further study.'

"About this time, on the 9th, the Emperor told the Chief of General Staff Headquarters (Prince KAN-IN): 'I will never consent to entering the war.' After this, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff came over to meet the Deputy Chief of the Naval General Staff and asked to have a discussion between both Headquarters, saying that the opinion of the Army had changed a little. At 1:00 p.m. on the 10th, the Navy Minister visited the Premier and asked: 'As I told you at the Five Ministers' Conference yesterday, the matter was discussed with the Naval General Staff Headquarters. There is no discrepancy in the opinion of the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff Headquarters. At that time, I was told the War Ministry and the Army General Staff Headquarters were agreed, but yesterday, the Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff Headquarters visited the Deputy Chief of the Naval General Staff and told him that there was a little change in opinion. Therefore, will you ask the War Minister about this?' Then, the Premier said: 'It

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~ makes matters difficult unless there is unification of the high command. If they agree and the result is contrary to my views or contentions, I am willing to change them to meet the decision (of the high command). Therefore, I request a settlement of this matter.' Furthermore, the Premier continued: 'Participation in war has a very broad meaning and covers anything from favorable neutrality to actual participation.' It is very outrageous for the Premier, who has always preached morality, to make such ambiguous statements." The foregoing was told to me by Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO.

On the night of the 10th, I left for Okitsu and met the Prince (SAIONJI) on the 11th. I reported everything, and the Prince said: "I understand in general, but what do the Premier and the members of the Cabinet think of the present situation?" He was very confused over this, but continued: "How about the situation after a German victory? One always must think a step ahead. For example, if Germany wins, what will her attitude be toward Japan? One must pay attention to this. I can never reason it out, it does not make any sense diplomatically nor politically."

On the 12th, when I talked over the phone with IKEDA Seihin, he said: "On the night of the 13th, the State Councillors will invite the Premier to Hoshigaoka and will exchange (discuss) the opinions on diplomatic problems. The reason for this meeting is that the State Councillors were appointed to discuss the China problems. The Army claims that the conclusion of the German-Italy-Japan treaty is the key to the solution of the China problem, but the government has not consulted us. We, the

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Councillors, have our own opinions and we are puzzled because we are held in the dark. Therefore, we would like to ask several questions of the Premier, but if we hold a conference, it will be too obvious and the newspapers will become annoying. Consequently, the Premier will be invited to dinner at Hoshigaoka and ask his opinions and at the same time, express ours. This has resulted in this meeting."

On the morning of the 13th, I (HARADA) visited Foreign Minister ARITA at his home and conversed for over two hours. He said: "Actual diplomacy is impossible in Japan. I fear that the Ambassadors of the United States and England must think it funny not to hear any compliments or any diplomatic language, but if I slip (on compliments or wordings), the Japanese Army and Navy will intercept the messages that were sent to their home governments. Right away, the Army and Navy will try to rebuke me by picking up a phrase or two although they don't know anything about it at all. I cannot tell the Ambassadors of other nations not to send wires because the Japanese Army or Navy will intercept them. I don't know what to do."

According to the story told by the Navy Minister to the Foreign Minister, the Premier might resign about Monday. Therefore, the Foreign Minister repeated that preparations for a succeeding Cabinet be made. I can't understand the attitude of the Premier, but if he cannot reply to Germany for four or five days, he will be compelled to resign. This seemed to be the opinion of Foreign Minister ARITA and the Navy Minister.

I called up the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and

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talked awhile. He said that he was not fully informed as yet. Prince CHICHIBU had an audience with the Emperor and proposed a speed-up of the treaty. The Emperor immediately answered: "Since this is one affair of state, the high command should not meddle. It is wiser to remain silent."

I also met MATSUDAIRA and he told me (HAFALA): "The Army General Staff Headquarters was more completely in favor of the treaty than the Naval General Staff Headquarters and were desirous of its conclusion. However, the Army; i.e., the General Staff Headquarters; has changed its attitude from this absolute demand to that of 'it cannot be helped if it is impossible'. On that point, they agree with the Navy. The Army and Navy have agreed to a conference before actual participation, but they do not agree upon how to express this 'participation'. This is the story of HIRATA, the Naval Aide-de-camp."

I left for Okitsu on the night of the 13th and spoke to IKEDA over the phone in the morning of the 14th. IKEDA said that at the meeting on the night of the 13th at Hoshigaoka, the Premier spoke very abstractly and did not mention anything concrete. The Premier thinks there will be no war in Europe, but if it ever started, Japan will not be dragged into it. If the opinions of the Army and Navy do not agree, I cannot administer state affairs. If they don't, I'll have them discuss and study until they do agree. At the meeting, the State Councillors told the Premier on several occasions that we must not be involved in the war in Europe and not let Germany and Italy take advantage of Japan.

After this, I went to see the Prince (SAIONJI) at

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10:30 a.m. and reported everything. I said: "KONOYE was the Premier at the time the war started and he left in the midst of it without any responsibility. Therefore, there are many who say that KONOYE should be made the Premier to take care of it." The Prince laughed it off and said: "It is very odd. That would be just like telling a thief to come back assuming that he won't steal again. Considering the present situation, the standard of the Japanese is very low. By no means do they come up to that of the foreigners. We cannot help it because the Army is running the show at the present."

I returned on the 15th and I met MATSUDAIRA. He said that the War Minister and the Premier had met in the morning and the Premier sent word to him (MATSUDAIRA) that he wished to see the Navy Minister on the morning of the 16th. MATSUDAIRA was wondering whether there was anything of importance or not.

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Chapter 326
(23 May 1939)

Hiranuma Backs Oshima

Translated by Lieut. Korry Seino

Since the Navy Minister and the Premier had met on the morning of the 15th, I asked Foreign Minister ARITA about it. ARITA said: "The Navy Minister was asked: 'How is the situation now in the Navy?' The Navy Minister answered: 'It is as steady as it has been from the beginning. There is no room for compromise in the Navy.' The War Minister said: 'I like the reply withheld for two or three days more.'"

Foreign Minister ARITA also told me: "The Premier asked me to come over to his room after the Cabinet meeting so I went. He said: 'I hear the American Ambassador is leaving on the 19th and I would like to have him take my message to the President.' The message is to the effect of: 'Japan would like to maintain the peace in Europe together with the United States. Therefore, Japan would like to contribute toward the settlement of the disputes as soon as possible.' About this (message), I would like to send it as the message of the Premier with further study. The Premier did not mention anything about the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact, so I did. He said just about the same thing that we heard from the Navy Minister. The Premier also said that he did not know what to do because the Navy will not compromise at all."

At noon on the 16th, I (HARADA) invited the American Ambassador and the Counselor (Embassy) together with their families for a little farewell party at the Sagano. At

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this party, the American Ambassador (J.C. GREW) told me: "When I meet the President and he might ask me: 'What does Japan demand of United States?, What attitude does Japan want United States to take in the China problem?, What should United States do to keep in pace with Japan?', I have no material on hand to answer these questions. What do you suggest?" I (HARADA) told him: "All right. Before you meet the Foreign Minister on the 19th, I will convey your desire to Foreign Minister ARITA. When you meet him, I will try to arrange it so that you get satisfactory answers." The Ambassador was very pleased and said: "Will you do that for me, please?"

As soon as I returned, I talked over the phone with ARITA. ARITA said that he just heard the same story from the Premier this noon. Furthermore, he had to listen to the lecture (by the Premier) of the peace with United States.

Later, I heard from the American Counselor (DOOMAN) that the Premier had sent a 'ronin' (ex-politician) with a message saying that he (Premier) desired to see DOOMAN. It seems as if the Premier wanted to meet him because DOOMAN can speak Japanese. At any rate he said he will meet with the Premier in a few days. So I (HARADA) told him (DOOMAN) to explain the general trends of the world frankly and openly. I called up ARITA and told him of these circumstances. ARITA said that the Premier was asking about DOOMAN, but I think it is cancelled now. Instead, I am to convey the message to the (American) Ambassador. However, I thought it to be very disagreeable for the Premier to use such a 'ronin' to convey and discuss important diplomatic problems.

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A few days later, I unexpectedly ran into DOOMAN on the street. He said: "The date for my meeting with the Premier has been set as the coming Tuesday, the 23rd." ARITA's guess was wrong and DOOMAN said: "I will let you know of the results of our meeting."

On the morning of the 18th, GREW met with Foreign Minister ARITA. ARITA said: "I've considered about three problems and talked about it today with GREW. First of all; a matter which is mentioned frequently; the real intention of the Japanese Government for the establishment of a new order in East Asia is not to be misconceived. For example, there are rumors of the monopolization of China by Japan or that Japan will expel European influence for the development of trade and economy. In order to destroy such rumors, I explained to him emphatically that Japan has no such intentions at all, and that Japan will protect the existing rights and interests of the other nations in China and will not hinder the economic activity of the United States and the European nations.

"Secondly, United States will be in error to establish a national policy with the impression that Japan joined the totalitarian nations by entering the Anti-Comintern Pact. Unless the United States clearly recognizes that Japan is not joining the totalitarian nations, it will cause trouble for each other in the event of deciding on a national policy. I want you to understand this point thoroughly. I hope to consider everything on the basis of peace and the goodwill toward the United States.

"Thirdly, concerning the matters of the islands along the southern coast of China and Hainan Island, there is apt to be the misunderstanding that Japan possesses the

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ambition to invade the South Seas and consequently, there are many who think that the Philippine Islands, Guam and Hawaii are in danger. Therefore, I fear that this may create an undesirable atmosphere in Japan-American relations. In case the American Government desires to know the policy of the Japanese Government, especially in this matter, the Japanese Government is ready to hold a conference at any time. GREW understood everything and returned aboard a ship which sailed that evening."

The Foreign Minister added the following to the American Ambassador as the message of the Premier. It is not desirable to have a war started in Europe. Though there are the points Germany and Italy should refrain from, it is also believed that there is room for consideration on the part of England and France. It is I presumed that the United States also believes in preventing war; Japan also entertains the same belief. In such circumstances, especially when both of us are outside of the Europe circle, there is room and bases for mutual co-operation to preserve the peace. These were added by the Foreign Minister and was sent to the President of the United States and the Secretary of State as the message of the Premier.

Late at night on the 18th, the Foreign Minister called up and asked: "I would like to meet the Navy Minister secretly and do you know of any suitable place?" I informed them of a vacant house of an acquaintance and the Navy Minister and the Foreign Minister spoke for about three hours. When the War and Navy Ministers met on the 17th, they had agreed on the two points shown to the Navy Minister by the War Minister.

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One of the two points was to delete that portion of the GAUSS draft which read: 'The three participant nations (in treaty) will not hinder any state of war which may arise.' Another point was a weakening of the announcement to say that this treaty was only applicable to the Comintern. The Navy Minister came over to ask the opinion of the Foreign Minister on these two points that the Navy and Army had agreed on for the first time. The Foreign Minister said that the deleting of the phrase: 'The three participant nations will not hinder any state of war which may arise', was not sufficient. Together with this deletion, the statement of Ambassador OSHIMA to Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP that Japan enter into a state of war, must be annulled or its effectiveness will suffer. The Navy Minister agreed generally to this opinion and because of this fact, the Navy Minister approached the War Minister and he again agreed. As previously stated, the Navy and War Minister reached an agreement on the morning of the 19th.

The Navy and War Ministers spoke individually to the Premier and a Five Ministers' Conference was held at 9:00 a.m. on the 20th. This problem was settled according to the aforementioned matters. Concerning the opinion of the Foreign Minister to annul the affirmative statement of Ambassador OSHIMA to Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP's query of whether it was understood that Japan would enter into a state of war, the Premier hemmed and hawed and did not appear to be in favor of annulling it. Although it cannot be said that the Army and Navy are completely agreed, it appeared as if a directive was to be issued immediately. Therefore, the Foreign Minister advised the Premier to

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report this matter to the Throne beforehand. The Premier immediately complied and reported to the Throne in the afternoon. After this report, the Premier stopped in at the offices of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and spoke with him. According to a subsequent report from the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Premier spoke very vaguely and it seemed as if he did not want the main points to be understood. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was very disgruntled at this attitude.

At 5:30 p.m., the Foreign Minister, Ambassador HOTTA, KIKUCHI, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and I met in Tsukiji. Foreign Minister ARITA also mentioned that the Premier was very vague, just as I had heard from the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal a little while ago. Because it seemed the Premier agreed with the Army to have the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact go as far as to mean actual participation in war, Foreign Minister ARITA was very much disappointed and said that even though the matter was settled, it still left a puzzling problem.

At the Five Ministers' Conference, the Premier was asked to rescind the answer of Ambassador OSHIMA, but he only said that was sufficient. Finally, the agreement stopped at the deletion of Paragraph III of the secret protocol; i.e., the participant nations, etc; and the revision of the announcement to be made to the world. The great factor behind the evil which was left lies in the fact that the annulment of the reply of Ambassador OSHIMA to RIBBENTROP, a matter which was pushed by Foreign Minister ARITA, had not been carried out.

I (HARADA) left on the night of the 21st for Okitsu,

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met the Prince (SAIONJI) and reported everything. When I related the decision of Five Ministers' Conference, the Prince said: "HIRANUMA is very cunning. Since the time of the Meiji Restoration, it has been an accepted fact not to use terms such as 'Orient' or 'Occident' in opposition to each other. In spite of the dissolution of terms contrasting the East and the West by the honorable intention of Emperor MEIJI, it is unpleasant to see the rightist elements and the military use them. The Premier constantly mentions moralistic diplomacy and I wonder what is meant by that? Diplomacy of any sort which disregards the national interests should not exist. In the first place, the word moralistic sounds like an invocation (prayer)." It sounded as if Prince SAIONJI was not pleased about it at all. Further I thought that I must remember that the meaning of the term interest as used by the Prince is founded upon a righteous sense and it is nothing personal.

Early on the morning of the 23rd, I called up Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO to ask of the situation. He said that both Ambassadors SHIRATORI and OSHIMA refused saying they will not consider that draft. At the same time, the Army said that there are some words missing (in the draft). He thought they (Army) were very abominable.

Later I talked over the phone with Foreign Minister ARITA. He said: "We discussed the matter at the Foreign Ministry last night. It fell back on their (Germany, Italy) demands to enter the war. The Army's contention that words were missing meant a clear-cut expression of participation in war and I cannot agree with them. Yesterday, I sent the Vice-Minister to the Premier (to ask his opinion), but he says that it should be done the way the

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the Army wants. It appears as if he wishes to have it read 'participation in war'."

Then, I talked over the phone with the Navy Minister. He was very enraged and said: "It is outrageous even to mention matters such as participation in war or actual fighting. In spite of the Emperor's refusal to General Staff Headquarters, the War Minister and the Premier, it is very abominable for the Premier to support the Army and the Ambassadors who take action contrary to the will of the Emperor."

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Chapter 337
(31 May 1939)

Army Negotiates with Navy

Translated by Sgt. Sadaki Teshima

From this time on, the Rightists became active again and as usual, rumors were rampant. When I (HARADA) spoke to the Navy Minister over the phone on the morning of the 24th, he clearly stated that the Navy still does not change its stand. Even if junior grade officers are sent to the Army for administrative negotiations, the Army will not comply. If there's an order from the Premier or the War Minister, it is a different matter, but when there are no orders whatsoever, the Army considered it unnecessary to confer with the Navy. The Army was very insistent in regard to this matter.

At that time, MACHIJIRI, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, said: "Foreign Minister ARITA will resign. He has already sent in a letter of resignation to the Premier. The reason for the Foreign Minister's meeting with the Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Premier, was for his resignation." The fact was that the Foreign Minister met the Premier and the Chief Cabinet Secretary concerning the original draft. He wanted to arrange a conference of the Army and Navy and the matter of resignation wasn't brought out at all. Therefore, the Army's determination was to have the Foreign Minister resign and have the Premier hold that post concurrently. As long as the Army and the Premier cooperate, everything should run smoothly. Such was the simple reasoning of the Army.

On the 25th, I (HARADA) met KONOYE and he said: "It is indeed a complicated matter. According to some source,

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men like Lt. Gen. OBATA (Binshiro) believe that it would be serious if a military alliance among Japan, Germany and Italy were concluded. It is said that they are advocating opposition to it. Since Education Minister ARAKI holds a similar opinion, Lt. Gen. OBATA, who is his intimate friend, encouraged ARAKI to break up this feeling at the Cabinet Council."

Moreover, upon conversing with Foreign Minister ARITA over the phone, he (ARITA) said: "Although the Army negotiated with the Navy, the junior ranks of the Army refused the negotiations by stating that it was unnecessary to negotiate with the Navy. I had the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs report this fact to the Premier. The Premier was requested to ask the Army to carry on administrative negotiations with the Navy. From about the 25th, the junior ranks began negotiating among themselves by re-considering the matter administratively and discussing the method of negotiating between the Army and Navy on this problem."

Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO said: "At any rate, although the original meaning will not be changed, we will clarify the indefinite points and make each point understandable."

On the 25th, there finally was a change in the office of Chief Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty and Gen. HATA Shunroku was appointed while the former Chief Aide-de-Camp, USAMI, resigned. Although the former Chief Aide-de-Camp wasn't a bad person at all, it seems he didn't have a will of his own, nor an understanding of the wishes of the Emperor. It can be conceived that this came about due to the great confusion of the Emperor. However, the matter of just how difficult it was for the Emperor or

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how greatly His Majesty was inconvenienced because of the Chief Aide-de-Camp can be attested to by the statement made by the Emperor to Aide-de-Camp HIRATA after the new Chief Aide-de-Camp had been installed. This was: "The new Chief Aide-de-Camp seems very capable." No one knows the reason why the Army changed the Chief Aide-de-Camp so unexpectedly. At the Office of the Aide-de-Camp, Vice-Admiral HIRATA carried out the orders of the Emperor in the proper way, and had the great confidence of the Emperor. So, it could be said that HIRATA was very oppressive while the former Chief Aide-de-Camp was in office and that the former Chief Aide-de-Camp was not relied upon by the office itself. Therefore, it can be conceived that the new Chief Aide-de-Camp was placed in office to oppose the Naval Aide-de-Camp.

I conversed with Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO over the phone on the morning of the 29th and he said: "I think the Army and Navy negotiations will take two or three days more. Negotiations were continued on the 26th, 27th and 28th, but there were only arguments and no results. Since this is not good, we are trying to think of what to do next. Such being the situation, the negotiations are still in progress."

The 27th was Navy Day, and from that day, the rightist groups from Kyushu continued to pour into Tokyo. There was a rumor that they brought danger to Adm. OKADA, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal YUASA, Imperial Household Minister MATSUDAIRA, IKEDA, YUKI and YONAI and YAMAMOTO of the Navy. Though the Kempeitai say they will protect the above-mentioned officials, in case anything should

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happen, they claim they will assassinate the officials alone. Such being the situation, the attitude of the Kempeitai is very bewildering for it cannot be ascertained whether they are the protectors of the officials or agents of the rightists.

I spoke to Vice-Minister of the Navy, YAMAMOTO, on the morning of the 31st and he said: "Yesterday (the 30th), a parley between the Army and Navy was held. The Vice-Ministers held a meeting, and since a decision had been reached at the Five Ministers' Conference of May 20th, it was not advisable to reverse the decision. As a decision had been reached, the Foreign Ministry must inform those abroad. However, if the explanation is insufficient, it would be advisable to explain more clearly. We parted with the decision that this matter would be reconsidered. Late last night, there was a phone call from the Vice-Minister of War and he wanted an explanation (plan) made by the Navy. This will be ready in two or three days."

Premier HIRANUMA and DOOMAN of the American Embassy had met secretly and since I (HARADA) wanted to hear what transpired, I invited DOOMAN to the Tokyo Club.

DOOMAN said: "It was the first time I dined and conversed at the Premier's residence. The Premier is a fine person. I was greatly impressed with the character of the Premier."

DOOMAN explained further that in the first place, the Premier holds a very unpleasant feeling towards England. DOOMAN said: "During the European conflict (First World War) Japan exerted all her efforts in compliance with the obligations of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by sending destroyers to the Mediterranean Sea, dispatching warships

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to Australia to convoy Australian soldiers to Europe, convoyed merchant ships, and paid dearly at Tsingtao. However, after the termination of the European conflict, England discarded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance just as she (England) would a worn out sandal. On top of this, during the Manchurian incident, England checked Japan with the Nine Power Treaty. Furthermore, with the London Naval Treaty, England intended to check Japanese naval power. The Premier was very chagrined over this attitude by England."

DOOMAN concluded: "I will honestly say this... Since you (HARADA) asked me to speak conclusively, I spoke thoroughly for three hours on the anticipated international situation after the conclusion of a Japan-Germany-Italy Military Alliance. My position is truly difficult. Regarding the contents of this problem, I (DOOMAN) sent a detailed telegram to Ambassador GREY who was due to dock at Vancouver tomorrow. If the public should find out about this, I will be put in an embarrassing position, so I want this matter be kept absolutely secret. Then if the matter of the Japan-Germany-Italy Military Alliance is to be concluded, Japan should then put the responsibility on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Japanese Government. I (DOOMAN) plan to make the matter an official conversation between the American and Japanese Governments. It seems only proper to do this."

On June 5th, KONOYE was to call on Prince SAIONJI, and the newspapers who got wind of this, spread all kinds of rumors. Some of them even said that KONOYE's visit to Okitsu (to see Prince SAIONJI) was to make preparations for change of government. I (HARADA) spoke

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with KONOYE over the phone for my own information.

Thinking it was better to make the situation clear to the Chief Cabinet Secretary, I called OTA (Chief Cabinet Secretary) and said: "Though there are various rumors, the reason for KONOYE's visit to Prince SAIONJI is just a social call since he (KONOYE) hasn't called on the Prince once after resigning from his post as Premier. This call by KONOYE has no political significance."

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Chapter 328
(6 June 1939)

Army and Navy Agree on Pact

Translated by Sgt. Sadaki Teshima

On the morning of the 1st, I met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at the Imperial Palace and he spoke of the time Chief Aide-de-Camp HATA was appointed by the Emperor. The Army had unexpectedly said changes will be made and the former Chief Aide-de-Camp resigned and Gen. HATA replaced him. As soon as Gen. HATA assumed his post, he was addressed by the Emperor regarding the strengthening of the Japan-Germany-Italy Anti-Comintern Pact. His Majesty said: "Get the details from YUASA." Then the Chief Aide-de-Camp came to see the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and listened to the past developments. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal politely told the Chief Aide-de-Camp that the Emperor was quite pleased and also that foreign policy plans were at a standstill.

Concerning the meeting of Premier HIRANUMA and DOHMAN, I said: "This is strictly confidential...." The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal said: "When I previously spoke to His Majesty, the Emperor, I asked His Majesty to bear in mind that it is said the Premier wanted this matter kept strictly confidential. When I informed the Emperor, His Majesty said to the Foreign Minister: 'Do you know that the Premier and the United States Charge d'Affaires held a secret meeting?' The Foreign Minister did not and replied: 'I do not.' I learned this later from the Emperor. The Foreign Minister must be cautioned or it would be very troublesome should he mention something about it to the Premier."

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I (HARADA) immediately called the Foreign Minister on the phone and discussed the matter. The fact was that the Foreign Minister was completely unaware of the matter and I thought I had better talk to the Foreign Minister.

On the morning of the 2nd, I called on him and gave him the complete details. I said: "If the story originated from the Premier from within the circles of the Foreign Minister, it would be all right to mention the matter. However, it would put us in a bad position if the Premier hears that I was the source." The Foreign Minister understood and said: "You may be sure of it."

I talked to YAMAMOTO over the phone and he said: "The Army and Navy came to a conclusion by the evening of the 2nd. I think the Premier will relate this matter to the Foreign Minister on the 3rd."

After that, I (HARADA) met the Foreign Minister in the morning and upon conversing with him, he (Foreign Minister) said: "I met with the Navy Minister and INOUE, the Naval Affairs Bureau Chief, last night, and was shown the original draft proposal. Although the decision of the Army and Navy is united on the surface, the meaning of the contents is different and it is a delicate situation. That is, just to talk of the matter is permissible, yet in the event other nations question us in regard to this matter, it would be distressing if the Army and Navy should reply with different meanings. So, in the future, the Army and Navy will study this matter further. If I (Foreign Minister) am called upon by the Premier, I'll stress the point deeply and I intend to have the Army and Navy study this matter once more."

On the noon of the 3rd, while I (HARADA) was having

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dinner at the Imperial Hotel, two to three young men from the Foreign Ministry were also dining there. They were saying: "KAGESA has brought WANG Ching-wei to Tokyo and he (WANG) is staying at the villa of FURUKAWA at Asukayama. KAGESA and INUKAI accompanies WANG all the time, and a meeting with Prince KONOYE is desired. The Army, the Navy and the Foreign Ministry came together and are preparing to organize a new government centered about WANG Ching-wei."

On the afternoon of the 3rd, I (HARADA) went to Shizuoka, and since Prince KONOYE was visiting NAKAMURA in Shizuoka I (HARADA) met him there and we conversed about a lot of things. On KONOYE's side, the other party of the Ran-sha (Blue Jacket Association) with AKIYAMA and KAMEI as the central figures and people who changed over from the Japanese Leftists to the Rightists factions got together and make connections with CHIANG Kai-shek to deal with the Chungking Government; that is, directly with CHIANG Kai-shek, as a movement to conclude peace. This will serve to block WANG Ching-wei, and KAO Tsung-wu has good connections with both CHIANG Kai-shek and WANG Ching-wei. Such was the situation, and when KONOYE's son Fumitaka was living in China, he made a lot of friends among CHIANG's followers, so KONOYE said that it was useless for Japan to support WANG. Then KONOYE worriedly said: "It is distressing to see Fumitaka assume responsibility to that extent."

I (HARADA) called on Prince SAIONJI on the morning of the 4th and reported on the progress until now. I also talked of the change in the post of Chief Aide-de-Camp and he (SAIONJI) said: "After all, the Chief Aide-

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de-Camp is credited with meritorious service service in past battles. In other words, didn't the Army appoint a high ranking general of experience in opposition to the Naval Aide-de-Camp?" I (HARADA) told Prince SAIONJI: "Though KONOYE will call on you tomorrow, according to his (KONOYE's) story, there isn't any special points to speak of. It's merely a simple greeting."

I (HARADA) came back to Tokyo together with KONOYE on the 5th. But, before I left, I spoke to Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO from Okitsu and he was saying that the research on the original bill has finally been completed and the War and Navy Ministers will meet at 10:30 a.m. today to reach a decision. Consequently, I (HARADA) came back, and upon conversing with the Minister of Foreign Affairs over the phone, the story was that the Army and Navy finally found an agreeable point, thus the problem of strengthening of the Japan-Germany-Italy Anti-Comintern Pact was clarified.